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I. INTRODUCTION
Doris Barrilleaux’s son died of AIDS.1 Five years later, when her financial
planner suggested that she help another AIDS victim by purchasing the victim’s life
insurance policy, she agreed.2 What Ms. Barrilleaux entered into is known as a
viatical3 settlement agreement, which involves an investor acquiring “an interest in
the life insurance policy of a terminally ill” individual.4 The original insured, the
viator, sells the policy to an investor at a discount and receives a lump sum with
which he can pay mounting medical bills.5 The investor’s rate of return is “the
difference between the discounted purchase price paid to the insured and the death
∗
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Tom Stieghorst, Florida Regulators Call Finances of Fort Lauderdale, Viatical Firm ‘Unsound,’ SUNSENTINEL, May 16, 2004, at 1E.
1

2

Id.

3 Miriam R. Albert, The Future of Death Futures: Why Viatical Settlements Must Be Classified as Securities, 19
PACE L. REV. 345, 347 n.8 (1999) (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1996) provides:

The term “viatical” comes from the Latin word “viaticum” which is
the…communion given to Christians who are dying or are in danger of
death; to the Romans, it meant money or provisions for a journey, but the
term came to refer to the last rites—something to sustain the deceased
person on his or her “last journey.”
SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (hereinafter “Life Partners IV”). For
purposes of this article, “Life Partners” in the main text refers to Life Partners IV.
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Jennifer Berner, Note, Beating the Grim Reaper, or Just Confusing Him? Examining the Harmful Effects of
Viatical Settlement Regulation, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 581, 584 (1994).
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benefit,” minus any transaction fees and premiums paid.6 If the viatical settlement
provider miscalculates life expectancy and the viator lives longer than anticipated, the
investor’s rate of return is reduced.7 Although the industry is often labeled
“ghoulish,”8 it has allowed many AIDS victims to live their final days much more
comfortably.9
Ms. Barrilleaux saw her chance to help someone with AIDS.10 After being
told that the investment would provide her with a fixed rate of return, she invested
$40,000.11 In Minnesota, Dick Hausten’s family invested $92,000 because they were
told that viatical settlements were safer than certificates of deposits and to expect a
high rate of return and guaranteed profit.12 Peggy, an eighty-two-year-old woman
from Colorado, invested $12,000 after being told that the viator would die within
two years.13 Upon hearing that certain viators were on their deathbeds, Pauline

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 537. There are two types of viatical settlements, brokered and nonbrokered. Timothy P. Davis, Should Viatical Settlements Be Considered “Securities” Under the 1933 Securities
Act?, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 75, 77 (1997) (hereinafter “T. Davis”). With non-brokered viatical
settlements, individual purchasers or companies buy the life insurance policy, and the viator names the
purchaser as the policy’s beneficiary. Id. Brokered viatical settlements involve an intermediary,
usually the viatical settlement provider, who, for a commission, matches investors with viators. Id.
The SEC is attempting to reach only brokered viatical settlements. Joy D. Kosiewicz, Comment,
Death for Sale: A Call to Regulate the Viatical Settlement Industry, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 701, 712 n.83
(1998). This facet of the industry is referred to as the secondary market. Id at 712. The secondary
market developed as viatical settlement providers began to sell fractional interests in the policies to
investors. Id. This commentary focuses only on the secondary market, i.e., brokered viatical
settlements.
6
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See T. Davis, supra note 6, at 75.

See, e.g., Michelle Singletary, Viaticals a Risk for Investors, COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER (Ga.), Mar.
11, 2002, at B1 (hereinafter “Singletary I”).
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Kosiewicz, supra note 6, at 706.
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Stieghorst, supra note 1.
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Kathy M. Kristof, Viatical Settlements Not the Secure Investment Some Marketers Claim, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
20, 1998, at D2 (hereinafter “Kristof I”).
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Grissom, a seventy-year-old woman living in Palm Springs, California, invested
$52,000.14
Arlene Kaplan from Coconut Creek, Florida, invested $15,000 after a
salesperson assured her she would receive a return of $19,000 once the viator, whose
life expectancy was less than three years, died.15 In Arizona, Nancy Del Valle and
her husband invested a large percentage of their retirement savings in a viatical
settlement after being told the viator was seventy-eight years old, had a heart
condition, hypertension, depression, and a variety of other ailments.16
In Minnesota, the viator has not died and Dick Hausten’s family suspects
fraud.17 Contrary to what they were told, investing in a CD at their local bank would
have been safer. Unlike CDs, their viatical settlement is not insured and they no
longer have access to their funds.18 In Colorado, Peggy’s daughter Victoria is trying
to get her mother’s money back.19 Five years after her mother invested in the viatical
settlement, the insured is still living.20 Victoria thinks “the ‘viator’—if there really is
such a person—will outlive [her mother]…[and] ‘[i]f [her] mother had invested more,
there would not be any money to have a home, pay the bills or eat.’”21 Pauline
Grissom also thinks she lost her $52,000.22 In addition, she has to pay a yearly
bookkeeping fee of $116 to the viatical settlement provider.23 Last year, Arlene
14

Nancy Vogel, Investors Suffer as Drugs Extend Lives, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000, at A1.

Glenn Singer & Tom Stieghorst, Weak Florida Laws Delayed Action against Firm That Defrauded
Investors, SUN-SENTINEL, May 7, 2004, at 1D.
15
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Singletary I, supra note 8.

17 Kristof I, supra note 12. Several “[y]ears later, [the Haustens] suspected misrepresentation for a
simple reason: ‘People weren't dying.’” Id.
18

Id.
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Id.

20

Id.

21

Id.
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See Vogel, supra note 14.
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Id.
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Kaplan filed a complaint with Florida’s Office of Statewide Prosecution because not
only has she not received the $19,000 she was promised, but she has also lost her
original $15,000 investment.24 Lastly, the Del Valles believe that they have lost their
entire investment because the viator has lived more than two years longer than
expected.25
Although “[t]he plural of anecdote is not [evidence],”26 the stories highlighted
above accurately represent the problem facing many individuals who invest in viatical
settlements.
The viatical settlement industry emerged and gained momentum in response
to the AIDS epidemic of the late 1980s.27 The industry grew quickly in part due to
the insureds’ inability to sell their life insurance policies.28 Viatical settlement
providers created a market for these policies. Initially, regulation of the industry was
focused on protecting the viator.29 The National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) developed model statutes under which states could develop
their own legislation to regulate the industry.30 Early legislation focused on the
24

Singer & Stieghorst, supra note 15.

25

Singletary I, supra note 8.

26 Roger Brinner is credited as having first made this statement. Paul Lee, The Nature of Anecdotes,
Skeptic Report, at http://www.skepticreport.com/health/natureanecdotes.htm (last visited Oct. 16,
2005).

Michael Cavendish, Policing Terminal Illness Investing: How Florida Regulates Viatical Settlement Contracts,
74 FLA. B.J. 10, 10–12 (Feb. 2000) (noting that in its first year, the industry brokered $90 million in
life insurance benefits and that by the year 2000, the industry was on course to generate $4 billion per
year); Abbie Crites-Leoni & Angellee S. Chen, Money for Life: Regulating the Viatical Settlement Industry,
18 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 65-66 (1997) (noting that Living Benefits Inc., located in Albuquerque, NM,
became the “first viatical settlement company” when it “purchased its first life insurance policy in
1989”).
27

28 See Crites-Leoni & Chen, supra note 27, at 73 (explaining that a few insurance companies offer
accelerated death benefits as an alternative).
29

See Kosiewicz, supra note 6, at 706.

Id. In order to protect the viator, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
drafted the Model Act and the Model Regulations. Id. The NAIC sought input from the National
Association of People with AIDS (NAPWA) and the Viatical Settlement Working Group, which
represented the viatical companies. Id. at 705-07. The Model Regulations included provisions
requiring documentation that the viator understands the ramifications of the agreement and is of
sound mind. Id. at 708. The viatical settlement company may have to disclose information to the
30
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insured because he or she was in a vulnerable position, facing certain death, and
desperate for funds.31 Initially, the investor’s needs were not in the forefront.32
In the mid-1990s, because of advances in medicine, AIDS patients began to
live much longer.33 Consequently, industry leaders acknowledged that investors
could become nervous and thereby hurt the business.34 Even after the medical
advances, however, investors35 nationwide were uniformly told they were making a
secure investment that would yield high, fixed rates of return.36 It was in this
environment that states began treating viatical settlement agreements as securities.37
viator, register with the state insurance commissioner, meet licensing requirements, and protect the
insured’s confidentiality. Id. The Model Act and Model Regulations also suggest setting a minimum
rate upon which viatical companies can base their offers to ensure that viators are receiving a fair
amount for their policies. Id.
31

See id. at 704.

32

See id. at 717.

33 David W. Dunlap, AIDS Drugs Alter An Industry’s Math; Recalculating Death-Benefit Deals, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 1996, at D1. In 1996, “an AIDS conference in Vancouver, British Columbia,…drew
worldwide attention to the development” of new AIDS medications. Id. Once these advancements
were made public, the amounts offered to viators with AIDS began to decrease. Id. Many viatical
companies were forced to reduce their dependence on AIDS victims and expand the market by
offering to buy policies from insureds with a variety of life-threatening illnesses. Id.
34

Brian Pardo, President of Life Partners, Inc., explained:
“If the press becomes bullish on these cures, it’s going to make the
market for viaticals more nervous. Investors will become skittish if they
believe there’s a cure in the near term, within a three-year window.
They’ll stop buying viaticals. That will shut off the flow of capital to
viatical companies.”
Id.

The average investor is seventy years old and invests an average of $40,000. Baird Helgeson,
Lawmakers Approve Protections For Viatical Settlement Investors, TAMPA TRIB., May 3, 2005, at 4.
35

See Humberto Cruz, Know Viatical’s Rules and Risks, LONG BCH. PRESS-TEL., Apr. 6, 2003, at BU2
(hereinafter “Cruz I”).
36

The following is a list of several state statutes that now expressly include viatical settlements in the
definition of a security: ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990 (Michie 2004) (defining “viatical settlement
interest” in paragraph (37) and “viator” in paragraph (38)); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1801 (West
2005) (defining “viatical or life settlement investment contract” in paragraph (29)); CAL. CORP. CODE
37
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For example, on June 16, 2005, Florida became the forty-seventh state to regulate
viaticals as securities.38
Not only were state legislators taking notice of the investment side of the
industry, but the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was also fighting to
require viatical settlement providers to register their product.39 The SEC asserted
that its rights under the securities laws allowed it to regulate these investments.40
§ 25019 (West 2005) (including “viatical settlement contract or a fractionalized or pooled interest
therein” and “life settlement contract or a fractionalized or pooled interest therein” in the definition
of security); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2(a) (2005) (defining “viatical investment” in paragraph (32) and
“viatical issuer” in paragraph (33)); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1 (West 2005) (including “viatical
settlement contract, any fractional or pooled interest in a viatical settlement contract” in subsection (k)
and defining “viatical settlement contract” under subsection (t)); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.102 (West
2005) (including “viatical settlement contract, or any fractional or pooled interest in such contract” in
subsection 28f and defining terms regarding viaticals in subsection 31A); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-71105 (2005) (including “viatical settlement investment contract or a fractionalized or pooled interest
therein” in the definition of security and defining terms regarding viaticals in subsection (p)); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 8-1101 (2005) (including “viatical settlement contract or any fractional or pooled interest
in such contract” in subsection 15 and defining “viatical settlement contract” in subsection 17); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 78A-2 (2005) (including in subsection (11) “viatical settlement contract or any fractional
or pooled interest in a viatical settlement contract” and defining terms relevant to viatical agreements
in subsection (13)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02 (2003) (including “viatical settlement contract or a
fractionalized or pooled interest therein” in subsection 15 and defining terms regarding viaticals in
subsection 16); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1707.01 (West 2005) (including “any life settlement
interest” in subsection B and explaining in subsection HH that “life settlement contract” includes
viatical settlement agreements); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-4-401 (Michie 2005) (including “viatical
settlement,” along with the term’s definition, in subsection n).
Kathy Bushouse, Bill to regulate viatical settlements passes Florida legislature, SUN-SENTINEL, May 3, 2005
(hereinafter “Bushouse I”). The Florida legislature amended Florida’s security statute, FLA. STAT. ch.
517.021 (2005), by adding “viatical settlement investment” to the definition of “security” under
subsection 21 and defining the term under subsection 23. S. 107-2412, Reg. Sess., at 2 (Fla. 2005)
(effective date: Oct. 1, 2005). Meanwhile, Doug Head, executive director of Viatical and Life
Settlement Association of America (VLSAA), a non-profit public relations firm which promotes the
needs of viatical settlement providers, argues that fraud has not “existed in a decade” and warns that
securities regulation will further impede the viatical market, thereby financially harming both investors
and viators. Helgeson, supra note 35.

38

39 Kosiewicz, supra note 6, at 712-13. Many in the viatical industry are opposed to SEC regulation. Id.
at 707. They claim that regulation would increase the administrative and financial burden on viatical
companies and decrease the amounts offered to viators. Id. The Viatical Association of America
(VAA) has worked to self-regulate the industry. Id. at 715. Unfortunately, its efforts have not been as
effective as needed, especially with regard to investors. Id. at 715-17.

SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D.D.C. 1995) (hereinafter “Life Partners I”) (noting
that the SEC based its claim on “sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933…[codified

40
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Viatical settlement companies refused to register their product because they claimed
that the product did not constitute a security.41 The SEC was forced to continue its
fight in the courts and filed an action against Life Partners Incorporated (LPI), the
largest viatical settlement provider in the nation at the time.42 LPI argued that
viatical settlements were not securities and therefore should not be monitored by the
SEC.43 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed and found
in favor of LPI. 44
The issue did not reach the federal appellate level again until May of 2005.
This time the defendant was viatical settlement provider Mutual Benefits
Corporation (MBC).45 It was with this corporation that Doris Barrilleaux invested.46
As Ms. Barrilleaux explained, MBC has her “‘$40,000 and [she] ha[s] nothing after six
years.’”47 She is one of the thousands of investors that face significant losses from

at] [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), 77e(c), 77q(a)], and sections 10(b), 15(a), and 15(c) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934…[codified at] [15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(a), 78o(c)]”). Under the Securities Act of 1933,
Congress designated the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as regulator of the securities market. See
17 C.F.R. § 200.1 (2005). Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC was created to replace
the FTC. Id. One of the SEC’s main purposes is to ensure public disclosure of relevant information
concerning securities that are sold. Id. §200.1(a). For purposes of this article, the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 will be referred to collectively as the “Securities Acts.”
Life Partners I, 898 F. Supp. at 18 (stating that defendants deny that their products constitute
securities).
41

42

See id. at 17.

43

See id. at 18.

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d 536, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that “LPI’s contracts are not securities
subject to the federal securities laws”).
44

SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005) (hereinafter “Mutual Benefits III”). For
purposes of this article, “Mutual Benefits” in the text refers to Mutual Benefits III.
45

46

Stieghorst, supra note 1.

47

Id.
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her investment after dealing with MBC.48 On May 20, 2004, Doris Barrilleaux’s
attorney filed a civil action on her behalf against MBC in a Florida state court.49
Meanwhile, the SEC filed an action against MBC in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida for various securities law violations.50
David Nelson, Director of the SEC’s Southeast Regional Office (SERO), stated that
“[t]he scope of [MBC’s] fraud is enormous.”51 Nelson asserted that MBC’s scheme
“involved more than 29,000 investors.”52 Much like Life Partners, Inc., MBC
claimed that viatical settlement agreements do not constitute securities.53 However,
unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit found in favor of the SEC.54
This article critically examines and analyzes both Life Partners and Mutual
Benefits and, in light of the relevant rule of law, suggests which case’s holding is most
appropriate.
Because the question of whether sales of viaticals are investment contracts
actually lies within the purview of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, Part II of this article examines the historical setting
surrounding these Acts and the policy rationale behind their enactments. Part III
provides an overview of the cases in which these Acts have been tested, and Part IV
examines comparatively the decisions and rationale of the D.C. Circuit case, Life
Partners, and the Eleventh Circuit case, Mutual Benefits.
Peter Zalewski, Recovery Effort: Suit in Fort Lauderdale Says Mutual Benefits Corp. Defrauded Investors of
$1.5 Billion Before Receivership, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., May 21, 2004, at 11.
48

“Barrilleaux’s suit alleges [that] the defendants committed breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
contract and negligence…. The suit requests compensatory damages of at least $1.5 billion plus
interest, punitive damages, [and] legal costs.” Id.

49

SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (hereinafter “Mutual Benefits
I”).

50

Patrick Danner, Death Benefit Firm Closed in Scam, MIAMI HERALD, May 6, 2004, at 1A (hereinafter
“Danner I”).
51

52

Id.

53

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d 737, 741 (11th Cir. 2005).

54 Id. at 745 (holding that viatical settlement agreements constitute “investment contracts” and are
subject to the securities laws).

2005]

VIATICAL SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY

15

Part V—as a corollary of Part IV, considers the reaction of both state and
federal courts to the Life Partners decision and looks at the consequential application
of the Life Partners precedent. Part VI explores the public policy in favor of the
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion. Part VII demonstrates the reasons why courts should
follow Mutual Benefits instead of Life Partners. The article concludes by providing
reasons why viatical settlement agreements should be considered securities and
therefore be subject to SEC regulation.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1933 AND 1934 SECURITIES ACTS
In order to determine whether an instrument is a security, courts usually
begin their analysis by looking to the Securities Act of 193355 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.56 “On September 1, 1929, ‘the aggregate value of all stocks
55 For purposes of this discussion, the relevant section of the 1933 Act is the section that
defines “security.” Section 1 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a),
provides:

[T]he term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security
future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or
group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into
on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a “security[,”] or
any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to
or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(10) provides:
56

The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future,
bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate
of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including
any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange
relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly
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listed on the New York Stock [E]xchange…was $89 billion[,]’ [but b]y the end of
October [their aggregate value] had fallen by $18 billion.”57 Two years later, the
market had suffered a $74 billion loss.58 On March 29, 1933, as one of his first acts
in office, President Franklin Roosevelt sent a message to Congress in which he
advocated the passing of legislation to supervise the securities market.59 His letter
stressed the importance of full disclosure by adding to “the ancient rule of caveat
emptor,60 the…doctrine ‘let the seller also beware.’”61 In addition to facilitating the
free flow of information, the goal of the Securities Acts was to “correct unethical and
unsafe practices on the part of…corporations.”62
In the 1920s, American investors spent $50 billion on new securities, half of
which turned out to be worthless.63 Congress responded by passing the Securities
Acts.64 As illustrated by President Roosevelt’s letter and the House and Senate
known as a “security[;”] or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance,
which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of
which is likewise limited.
57 William L. Doerler, Comment, SEC v. Life Partners, Inc.: An Extended Interpretation of the Howey Test
Finds That Viatical Settlements are Investment Contracts, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 253, 254 (1997).
58

Id.

59

Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1–2 (1933); S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 6–7 (1933).

60

Latin for “let the buyer beware.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 236 (8th ed. 2004).

H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2; S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 6. Roosevelt’s words are in stark contrast to those
uttered by Doug Head, the head of the VLSAA, when he dismissed investor complaints by explaining,
“‘Hey, it’s caveat emptor…. Take your chances, dude, don’t come crying to me.’” Arthur Allen, As They Lay
Dying, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1996, at W13 (emphasis added).

61

62

H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2; S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 7.

63

H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2.

See id. The 1933 Act deals with the initial issuance of securities and requires securities traded via
interstate commerce to be registered. 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION
225 (3d ed. 1999). The 1934 Act focuses on the distribution of securities and has four objectives: “to
afford a measure of disclosure to people who buy and sell securities; to prevent and afford remedies
for fraud in securities trading and manipulation of the markets; to regulate the securities markets; and
64
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reports, the aim of the Acts was two-fold.65 First, Congress hoped to protect
investors by forcing sellers of securities to provide investors with “material
information” about their products.66 Second, the Acts were an attempt to curb fraud
and deceit in securities sales, which, according to House and Senate reports, was
commonplace.67
Roosevelt elaborated on the first objective, stating that “every issue of new
securities to be sold…shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and
that no essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the
buying public.”68 The theory behind full disclosure was that the free flow of
information would enable investors to educate themselves before investing their life
savings.69 Congress did not pass the Securities Acts to create a paternalistic SEC.70
As long as securities dealers71 fully disclose all relevant information, “the SEC has no

to control the amount of the Nation’s credit that goes into those markets.” Id. at 226. Louis Loss “is
considered the intellectual father of securities law in the United States…[and] is the author of an 11volume treatise on securities law, which has been cited by courts hundreds of times,” including fifty
times by the Supreme Court. Louis Loss, Emeritus Law Professor, Securities Law Specialist, Dies at 83,
HARV.
U.
GAZETTE,
Jan.
15,
1998,
available
at
http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/1998/01.15/LouisLossEmerit.html.
65

H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1–2; S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 6–7; T. Davis, supra note 6, at 76.

66

T. Davis, supra note 6, at 76.

67

See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2; S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1.

68

H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2; S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 6.

69

See Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d 536, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, J., dissenting).

H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2; S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 6 (President Roosevelt explained that “the Federal
Government cannot and should not take any action which might be construed as approving or
guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or
that the properties which they represent will earn profit”); see also 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 64
at 225 (stating that “[t]he Commission has no authority to approve any security or to pass on its
merits.”).

70

15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(12) (2005) provides, “The term ‘dealer’ means any person who engages either for
all or part of his time, directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business of offering,
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another person.” Courts often
refer to dealers as “promoters.”
71
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power to prevent a security from being marketed because it believes the security to
be too risky.”72 In other words, the final decision rests with the investor.
When profits depend on the promoter’s activities, the purpose behind
requiring disclosure is clear because, in this scenario, investors do not have access to
all relevant information. 73 This is especially true when the type of information
necessary for an investor to make an informed decision is specific to the promoter.74
An investor needs to know “not generally how [a given] activity has fared but what
the specific risk factors attached to the investment are and whether there is any
reason why the investor should be leery of the promoter’s promises.”75 Investors,
however, do not need such information when their profits depend primarily on
market forces.76 In that situation, “the realization of investor profits is fundamentally
outside of the promoter’s control.”77 In addition, when investor profits are
dependent on the market, “there will be public information available to an investor
by which the investor [can] assess the likelihood of the investment’s success.”78 For
example, when investing in artwork, a potential buyer can research the art market. If
considering an investment in silver bars, the investor can assess trends in the silver
market.79
Moreover, when investor profits depend on the market,
“‘registration…could provide no data about the seller which would be relevant
to…market risks.’”80
The second objective of the Securities Acts was “to prevent further
exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities
72

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 550 (Wald, J. dissenting).

73

Id. at 552.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Id. (quoting SEC v. G. Weeks Sec., Inc., 678 F.2d 649, 652 (6th Cir. 1982)).
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through misrepresentation.”81 Congress thought that, by encouraging honest
dealings, it could rekindle public confidence in the securities market.82 Prior to the
passage of the Securities Acts, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
engaged in a long, publicized investigation into both “the stock market[’s business]
practices and the reasons [behind] the stock market crash of October 1929.”83
Congress acknowledged that fraudulent practices harm the stock market in general,
and the Securities Acts were meant to “protect honest enterprise…against the
competition afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked
promotion.”84 Congress did not want fraudulent promoters poisoning free market
competition and thus making it more difficult for honest businesses to make a
profit.85
Because the Securities Acts were remedial in nature,86 courts have construed
the laws “‘flexibly to effectuate [their] purposes,’” rather than “‘technically and
restrictively.’”87 Because Congress was aware that there was an infinite number of
possible enterprises in which to invest, it included the all-encompassing term
“investment contract” in the definition of security.88 Congress looked to state blue
81

S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1 (1933).

82 Id. The Supreme Court explained that the Securities Acts were an attempt “to eliminate serious
abuses in a largely unregulated securities market.” United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 849 (1975). In making that attempt, Congress focused “on the capital market of the enterprise
system: the sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes, the exchanges on which
securities are traded, and the need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the interest of
investors.” Id.

Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 n.10 (1967) (citing Philip A. Loomis, Jr., The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 216-17
(1960)).
83

84

S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1.

85

See id.

86 Id. at 7; H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933) (President Roosevelt directed Congress to enact
“legislation to correct” the problems caused by the stock market crash) (emphasis added).
87

SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).

SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (stating that “Congress was using a term the
meaning of which had been crystallized by…prior judicial interpretation[, and]…[i]t is therefore
reasonable to attach that meaning to the term as used by Congress, especially since such a definition is
consistent with the statutory aims”).

88
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sky laws’89 definitions of “security” and state courts’ consistently broad
interpretations of the term “investment contract” within those definitions.90
Congress included this term in its definition of “security” specifically to regulate
novel and unorthodox investments.91 Congress intentionally failed to define the
term “investment contract” and instead transferred that responsibility to the courts.92
III. JURISPRUDENCE BEGINNING WITH U.S. V. HOWEY
In the landmark decision United States v. W.J. Howey,93 the United States
Supreme Court defined “investment contract.”94 The seller of the securities, W.J.
69A AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation—State § 1 (2004). Kansas was the first state to regulate its
securities market. Id. By the time Congress passed the federal securities acts, forty-seven other states
had followed Kansas’ lead. Id. The purpose of the state blue sky laws was “to stop the sale of stock
in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and…‘speculative schemes which have
no more basis than so many feet of blue sky.’” Id. (quoting Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539
(1917)).
89

90Howey,

328 U.S. at 298, provides:
The term “investment contract”…was common in many state “blue sky”
laws in existence prior to the adoption of the federal statute and, although
the term was also undefined by the state laws, it had been broadly
construed by state courts so as to afford the investing public a full
measure of protection.

91 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943) (holding that “the reach of the Act
does not stop with the obvious and commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever
they appear to be, are also reached”). Courts have found a wide variety of unique investment schemes
to constitute securities. See, e.g., SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004) (pay phones); Bailey v. J.W.K.
Props., Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 919 (4th Cir. 1990) (cattle breeding); Miller v. Cent. Chinchilla Group, Inc.,
494 F.2d 414, 415 (8th Cir. 1974) (chinchillas); Cont’l Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir.
1967) (beavers); Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961) (mineral leases); Penfield Co. v.
SEC, 143 F.2d 746, 747 (9th Cir. 1944) (whiskey bottling contracts); SEC v. Crude Oil Corp., 93 F.2d
844 (7th Cir. 1937) (crude oil sales contracts).

United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (explaining that “[t]he task has
fallen…to the federal courts to decide which of the myriad financial transactions in our society come
within the coverage of [the Securities Acts]”).
92

93328

U.S. 293 (1946).

Id. at 301. The Court first interpreted the Securities Acts ten years after their being passed. Joiner
Leasing, 320 U.S. at 344. In Joiner, the Court held that the proper test to determine the existence of a
security “is what character the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of

94
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Howey Company (Howey), operated a citrus farm in Florida.95 Howey solicited
investors nationwide to finance the enterprise.96 Each investor entered into a land
sale contract under which Howey promised to convey a tract of land and a service
contract by which Howey promised to cultivate, harvest, and market the crops
grown on the tract of land. 97 Investors had neither discretion nor authority over the
process and could not even enter upon the land without the promoter’s consent.98
After the harvest, the investor received the net profits from his tract of land, less the
costs of labor and materials.99
In determining whether the buyers had invested in a security, the Court
acknowledged that the Securities Acts failed to define “investment contract.”100
Because Congress had considered state blue sky laws when passing the Securities
Acts, the Court considered how state courts had interpreted the term “investment
contract.”101 The state courts’ flexibility complied with the legislature’s goal of
protecting the investing public from a limitless variety of schemes.102 The Court
refused to restrict its analysis to the form of the agreement, in this case a simple

distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the prospect.” Id. at 352–53. However, in
Howey, the Court clarified the definition of “security.” Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
Howey, 328 U.S. at 295. Howey was brought under the Securities Act of 1933. However, the United
States Supreme Court has explained that it has “repeatedly ruled that the definitions of ‘security’…in
the 1934 Act and…the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will be treated as such in [its] decisions.”
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.1 (1985).
95

96

See Howey, 328 U.S. at 296.

97

Id. at 295.

98

Id. at 296.

99

Id.

100

Id. at 298.

101 Id. (explaining that in the state courts, “[a]n investment contract…came to mean a contract or
scheme for ‘the placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit
from its employment’”) (quoting State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn.
1920)).
102

Id. at 299.
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conveyance of property, and instead looked to the economic reality of the
arrangement.103
Based on the economic reality analysis, the Court created a four-pronged
conjunctive test.104 Under this test, an investment contract is any “transaction or
scheme whereby a person [1] invests his money [2] in a common enterprise and [3] is
led to expect profits [4] solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”105
The Court concluded that this test “embodie[d] a flexible rather than a static
principle…capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised
by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.”106
Because investors did not purchase the land for their own use but instead in order to
get a percentage of the overall profit generated by the promoters, the Court held that
an investment contract existed.107 Following Howey, federal courts have also applied
the test flexibly.
A. Investment of Money
This prong of the test is almost always satisfied and often overlooked. When
analyzing this prong, courts look to whether risk is an ingredient in the investment.108
This prong requires that the investor “commit his assets to the enterprise in such a
manner as to subject himself to financial loss.”109

103

See id. at 297-98.

104 Id. at 299. Courts often apply the Howey test using three prongs and explaining that “an investment
contract is a security…if investors purchase with (1) an expectation of profits arising from (2) a
common enterprise that (3) depends upon the efforts of others.” Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d 536, 542
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
105

Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99.

106

Id. at 299.

107

Id. at 299-300.

108

Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976).

109

Id.
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B. Common Enterprise
There are two types of commonality, vertical and horizontal.110 With regard
to horizontal commonality, the court determines the nature of the relationship
among the investors.111 This type of commonality is generally considered more
difficult to establish.112 The three essential elements of horizontal commonality are
“(1) a pooling of investors’ resources; (2) profit sharing among the investors; and (3)
loss sharing among the investors.”113 For example, in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp.,114 the promoter solicited funds from investors nationwide in order to finance
his oil drilling business. The investors received a percentage of the profits generated
by the promoter’s oil wells, and these profits rose and fell together.115
On the other hand, when determining whether vertical commonality exists,
courts look at the relationship between the promoter and the investor.116 Vertical
commonality “requires that the investor and the promoter be involved in some
common venture without mandating that other investors also be involved.”117 For
example, in SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enterprises,118 Mr. Reynolds informed investors that
110

Doerler, supra note 57, at 261.

111

Id. at 262.

112 Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (explaining that the “horizontal
commonality” test is more stringent than the “vertical commonality” test). The horizontal test not
only requires that a relationship exist among the investors; it further requires that the relationship
exhibit specific characteristics. The vertical test requires only the presence of a relationship between
the investor and the promoter. Id.
113 Dave Luxenberg, Comment, Why Viatical Settlements Constitute Investment Contracts Within the Meaning
of the 1933 & 1934 Securities Acts, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 357, 365 (1998) (citing Life Partners IV, 87
F.3d 536, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
114

320 U.S. 344, 346 (1943).

115

Id. at 348-49.

Doerler, supra note 57, at 262 (noting that there are two types of vertical commonality, “broad
vertical,” which requires that the investors’ fortunes be tied to the promoter’s efforts, and “strict
vertical,” which requires that the investors’ fortunes be tied to the promoter’s fortunes).
116

117

Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978).

118

952 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 1991).
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he would take a certain percentage of their profits as his management fee.119 Because
the promoter’s commission was contingent upon the investors’ profits, the court
deemed the vertical commonality requirement satisfied.120
There is a split among the federal circuits regarding the “common enterprise”
prong.121 Currently, the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits apply the more stringent
horizontal commonality test.122 The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits require only
vertical commonality.123 The Supreme Court has not resolved the split thus far.124
C. Expectation of Profits
When determining whether the “profits” prong is satisfied, most courts
follow the Supreme Court’s decision in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.125 In
Forman, United Housing Foundation (UHF) organized the development of Co-op
City, a low-income housing facility.126 UHF established Riverbay Corporation
(Riverbay) “to own and operate the land and buildings constituting Co-op City.”127
For each room that a tenant desired, he or she had to purchase eighteen shares of
Riverbay stock.128 Because the Securities Acts define security as “any note [or]
119

Id. at 1130–31.

120

Id. at 1131.

121

Doerler, supra note 57, at 257.

122

Id.

123

Id.

See Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1117 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to
grant certiorari in light of the spilt among federal appellate courts regarding commonality).

124

125 421 U.S. 837 (1975); see also Stephanie Ann Miranda, Can Pre-Purchase Entrepreneurial Efforts Satisfy the
Fourth Prong of the Howey Test? A Critique of SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 269,
283 (1997) (noting that under Forman, “courts generally agree that both monetary and non-monetary
forms of returns or earnings on one's investment will meet the ‘expectation of profits’ sub-element”).
126

Forman, 421 U.S. at 841.

127

Id.

128

Id. at 842.
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stock,”129 the Court had to determine whether the buying of stock from Riverbay
should be monitored by the SEC.130
The Court ultimately held that the stocks in the case at bar did not constitute
securities.131 Conscious of its reasoning in Howey, the Forman Court focused on the
economic reality of the arrangement rather than the term used.132 The Court
provided two forms of “profits” that satisfy this element: “capital appreciation
resulting from the development of the initial investment”133 and “participation in
earnings resulting from the use of investors’ funds.”134
In Forman, the tenants were not expecting to receive a financial return on
their investment.135 Furthermore, the tenants’ money was not pooled solely to fund
the construction of Co-op City.136 Instead, the tenants bought stock from Riverbay
in order to obtain a place to live.137 The Forman Court’s decision crystallized the term
“profit” by differentiating the tenant’s expected return with the purely financial
return in Howey.138 Courts now focus on whether the investor reasonably expects a
monetary return or whether he or she invests for consumption purposes.139 The
latter does not amount to a security.

129

Id. at 847 (quoting the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)).

130

Id. at 848.

131

Id. at 851.

132

Id. at 848.

133

Id. at 852 (citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943)).

134

Id. (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967)).

135

Id. at 853.

136

Id. at 843.

137

Id. at 853.

Michael R. Davis, Note, Unregulated Investment in Certain Death: SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 42 VILL.
L. REV. 925, 935–36 (1997) (hereinafter “M. Davis”) (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 853).
138

139

Forman, 421 U.S. at 858.

26

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 7

D. Based on the Efforts of Others
Finally, in order for an instrument to be deemed an investment contract, the
profits must be generated “solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party.”140 Following the Howey Court’s insistence on flexibility, in SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Enterprises, Inc.,141 the Ninth Circuit declined to literally apply the fourth prong,
namely the term “solely.”142 The Turner court adopted a more realistic approach,
considering “whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the
undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure
or success of the enterprise.”143 The court reasoned that adhering to a strict
interpretation of the word “solely” “could result in a mechanical, unduly restrictive
view…of an investment contract…[that]…would be easy to evade by adding a
requirement that the buyer contribute a modicum of effort.”144 In other words, the
Turner court did not want to create a loophole by which promoters could easily avoid
SEC regulation by manipulating their schemes to fall outside the definition of
“investment contract.”
One year later, the Fifth Circuit, in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,145 added
support to the Turner holding. The court explained that the state court cases on
which the Howey Court based its definition of “investment contract” did not strictly
apply the “solely from the efforts of others” prong.146 In these state court decisions,
despite the investors’ participation, courts held that an investment contract existed.147
In addition, the court noted that, in Howey, the Supreme Court cited several circuit
140

SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).

141

474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).

142

Id. at 483.

143

Id. at 482.

144

Id.

145

497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).

146Id.

at 480.

Id. (citing State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937 (Minn. 1920) (involving an agreement
that required investors to act as booster agents for the sale of tires); Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp.,
161 A. 193 (N.J. Ch. 1932) (involving an arrangement under which investors would raise rabbits
bought from the promoter who, in turn, would purchase the offspring for a fixed price)).
147
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court cases that either failed to mention the word “solely” or did not impliedly
support a strict construction of the rule.148 The Koscot court also included a long list
of cases in which other courts had held that an investment contract was present
despite actions taken by investors.149 Recently in SEC v. Edwards,150 the Supreme
Court implicitly supported the holdings of both Koscot and Turner.151 The Court
clarified the Howey test in holding that an investment contract is “‘the presence of an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to
be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.’”152 Because the
Supreme Court is undoubtedly aware of the case law construing the term
“investment contract,” it more than likely purposefully omitted the word “solely”
from its definition of “investment contract.”
Id. at 481 n.11 (citing SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass’n, 106 F.2d 232, 237 (7th Cir. 1939) (the court
omitted the word “solely” from its definition of “investment contract,” stating that an “investment
contract” is an “investment of money with the expectation of profit through the efforts of [others]”);
SEC v. Crude Oil Corp., 93 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1937) (the court did not mention the word “solely” at
all)).
148

149

Id. at 482.
Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974)
(investors purchased and raised Chinchillas which were then repurchased
by promoters and sold by [the] latter to new prospects);…Blackwell v.
Bentsen, [203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953)] (deeds for citrus acreage and
management contracts, with provision that purchasers are permitted to
give directions as to the marketing of crops on their tract); 1050 Tenants
v. Jakobson, 365 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (offering of shares of
stock, entitling purchasers to proprietary leases in apartment at 1050 Park
Avenue, which after closing date, was to be managed by tenants); Mitzner
v. Cardet International, Inc. et al., 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1973)
(scheme wherein area managers recruited area distributors who in turn
found people to deliver Cardet brochures and pick up orders and deliver
Cardet products to purchasers); SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D.
Tex. 1961) (in lieu of investing capital in potential profits of a mining
company, workers were entitled to invest by participating in mining and
other operations on a non-salaried basis).

Id.
150

540 U.S. 389 (2004).

151

Id. at 395.

152

Id. (quoting United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)).
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In Williamson v. Tucker,153 the court also focused on the fourth prong.154 The
Williamson court created a list of factors to consider when applying this element of
the test, including whether:
(1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little
power in the hands of the partner or venturer that the
arrangement in fact distributes power as would a
limited partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is
so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business
affairs that he is incapable of intelligently exercising
his partnership or venture powers; or (3) the partner
or venturer is so dependent on some unique
entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter
or manager that he cannot replace the manager of the
enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful
partnership or venture powers.155
The Williamson test suggests that courts should focus on the investor’s degree
of dependence on the promoter. Therefore, the less the investor’s involvement, the
more likely the “efforts of others” element is satisfied.156 For example, in Howey, the
investors lived all over the country, had no input in the daily activities of the citrus
enterprise, and were not even permitted to enter their land without the promoter’s
permission.157 Due in part to the investors’ complete lack of control, the Court
deemed the fourth prong satisfied.158

153

645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981).

Id. at 424. In Williamson, the court applied the Securities Acts to a series of transactions in which
undivided interests in a parcel of undeveloped real estate were transferred to several joint ventures
created for the purpose of holding the interests for a small number of purchasers, in exchange for
promissory notes from the purchasers to the original owners of the property. Id. at 406.
154

155

Id. at 424.

156

Id.

157

SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 296 (1946).

158

Id. at 300.
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E. Howey Today
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court again applied the Howey test in
SEC v. Edwards.159 In Edwards, business owners purchased payphones from ETS
Payphones, Inc. (ETS).160 In addition, the buyer entered a lease, management
agreement, and buyback agreement with ETS.161 ETS selected the site, installed the
phone, arranged for phone service, collected the coins, handled repairs, and generally
maintained the payphone.162 The buyer received a guaranteed eighty-two dollars per
month, plus “a [fourteen percent] annual return” on his or her investment.163 The
buyback agreement, into which a majority of buyers entered, provided that the buyer
could return the phone within 180 days and ETS would refund the purchase price.164
ETS’s solicitation materials trumpeted “‘an exciting business opportunity…[with] the
potential for ongoing revenue generation that is available in today’s pay telephone
industry.’”165
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the scheme constituted an
investment contract.166 The case focuses on investor protection and “in tone and
analysis reads very much like Howey.”167 The Court began its analysis with an
explanation of the legislative intent surrounding the Securities Acts, namely “‘to
regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are
called.’”168 The Court also highlighted Congress’ reasons for including the term
159

540 U.S. 389 (2004).

160

Id. at 391 (explaining that Charles Edwards was the CEO of ETS).

161

Id.

162

Id. at 391-92.

163

Id. at 391.

164

Id. at 392.

165

Id.

Id. at 397; see also 2 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 512–16, 514 (Supp.
2005) (noting that Justice O’Connor, “perhaps in an unconscious bow to post-Enron jurisprudence,”
wrote the decision with a populist tone).
166

167

2 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 166, at 516.

168

Edwards, 540 U.S. at 393 (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990)).
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“investment contract” in the definition of “security,” noting that Congress chose this
term in light of state courts’ broad interpretation of the same term in their blue sky
laws.169
The issue facing the Court was whether an investment scheme that “offered
a contractual entitlement to a fixed, rather than a variable, return” constituted a
security.170 In reaching its conclusion, the Court refused to “read into the securities
laws a limitation[,] not compelled by the language[,] that would…undermine the
laws’ purposes.”171 The Court explained that it did not find any distinction between
fixed and variable returns in state blue sky laws.172 In addition, post-Howey precedent
stressed that the Securities Acts were meant to reach “‘countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise
of profits.’”173 Furthermore, in Edwards, the Supreme Court unanimously re-affirmed
the need to be flexible when applying the securities laws.174 Even before Edwards,
both the Eleventh175 and D.C. Circuits were able to look to well-developed case law
interpreting the Securities Acts in general and the term “investment K” in particular,
to determine whether viaticals constitute securities.
IV. COMPARISON OF MUTUAL BENEFITS AND LIFE PARTNERS
The SEC asserts that viatical settlements are securities and that therefore the
Securities Acts give it the power to regulate this industry.176 In 1996, the SEC
Id. at 393-94 (explaining that blue sky laws were “precursors to federal securities regulation and
were so named…because they were ‘aimed at promoters who ‘would sell building lots in the blue sky
in fee simple’’”) (citing 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 64, at 31-43, 36).
169

170

Id. at 391.

171

Id. at 395.

172

Id.

173

Id. at 393 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946)).

174

Id.

175 Because Mutual Benefits was decided shortly after Edwards, the Eleventh Circuit was able to gauge
the current Court’s interpretation of the term “investment contract.”
176 See Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d 737, 740 (11th Cir. 2005); Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d
1337, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
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unsuccessfully attempted to make Life Partners, Inc. (LPI) comply with the
Securities Acts.177 Even after this initial setback, the SEC continued its fight.178 In
May 2004, it filed a complaint against a Florida-based viatical settlement company,
Mutual Benefits Corporation (MBC), alleging that it too had violated federal
securities laws.179 This time the SEC was victorious.180 Contrary to the D.C.
Circuit’s opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held that viatical settlement agreements do
constitute securities.181 A comparison of these two decisions is imperative.
A. Life Partners Facts and Procedure
In Life Partners, the SEC filed an action in which it claimed that LPI was
selling unregistered securities.182 At the time, LPI was the largest viatical settlement
company in the United States and “accounted for more than half of the [viatical
settlement] industry’s estimated annual revenues” in 1994.183 Much like MBC, LPI’s
basic plan entailed buying insurance policies from viators and then selling fractional
interests in those policies to retail investors.184 Prior to closing on a policy, LPI
arranged for its doctors to perform a medical evaluation of the insured.185 LPI also
reviewed the insurance policies, opting to buy only those policies that met a certain
standard.186 During the litigation process, LPI changed its business scheme three

177

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d 536, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

178

See, e.g., Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.

179

Id. at 1337-38.

180

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 745.

181

Id.

182

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 538.

Id. at 539. Brian Pardo owned ninety-five percent interest in the company and acted as its
president. Id.

183

Id. LPI hired 500 independent financial planners and paid them ten percent of the insurance
policy’s purchase price to recruit investors. Id.

184

185

Id. at 539.

186

Life Partners I, 898 F. Supp. 14, 17, 22 (D.D.C. 1995).
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times, creating what the court referred to as Version I, Version II, and Version III.187
The post-purchase activities differ in each version.188
In Version I, LPI, and not the investor, was the record owner of the policy
and was designated as the policy’s beneficiary.189 In Version II, LPI was no longer
the owner but could still hold the policy, monitor the insured’s health, pay
premiums, convert a group policy into an individual policy, file the death claim,
collect and distribute death benefits, and assist investors who wanted to resell their
interests.190 In Version III, LPI no longer provided any post-purchase services,
shifting all responsibility to the investors.191 The investors, however, could purchase
these services from Sterling Trust Company, an independent escrow agent hired by
LPI.192
In 1995, the SEC filed a motion for a preliminary injunction claiming that
LPI had violated securities laws.193 The court held that LPI’s scheme constituted an
investment contract and ordered LPI “to bring [its operations] into compliance with
securities laws.”194 LPI responded by transforming its scheme from Version I to
Version II.195 Because the SEC was not satisfied with LPI’s efforts, it filed a motion
to hold LPI in contempt for continuing to engage in the practice of selling
unregistered securities.196 The district court again held that an investment contract
existed and ordered LPI to comply with the securities laws.197 LPI was “preliminarily
187

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 539-40.

188

Id.

189

Id. at 539.

190

Id. at 540.

191

Id.

192

Id.

193

Life Partners I, 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D.D.C. 1995).

194

Id. at 24.

195

See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 4, 6-7 (D.D.C. 1996) (hereinafter “Life Partners II”).

196

Id. at 7.

197

Id. at 12.
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enjoined from…offering or selling unregistered securities in the form of investment
contracts representing fractional interests in the death benefits.”198 Accordingly, LPI
again altered its scheme in order to avoid securities laws by creating Version III.199
The SEC was not satisfied and filed an emergency motion for supplemental
provisional relief.200 The court preliminarily enjoined LPI from selling interests in
death benefits pending the decision of the D.C. Circuit.201
B. Mutual Benefits Facts and Procedure
In 2004, the SEC again sought to make the largest viatical settlement
provider in the United States—this time Mutual Benefits Corporation—comply with
securities regulation.202 The SEC filed an action in federal court alleging violations of
various securities laws.203 MBC was run by brothers, Joel and Leslie Steinger, and
198

Id. at 12–13.

See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 94-1861, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3451, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 19,
1996) (hereinafter “Life Partners III”).

199

200

Id. at *1.

201

Id. at *3–4.

202Mutual

Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Danner I, supra note 51. MBC’s size and
financial power enabled it to influence Florida state legislators. Danner I, supra note 51. Prior to its
being hauled into court by the SEC in Florida, MBC successfully lobbied to decrease the state’s ability
to regulate viatical settlement providers. Id. At the behest of MBC lobbyists, state legislators added
an amendment at the last minute that “strip[ped] authority from two of the three Florida regulators
who oversee the controversial viaticals business.” Bush Signs Viatical Bill, ST. PETE. TIMES (Fla.), July
2, 2004, at 1D. One week after the bill became law, MBC’s offices were raided and its assets frozen.
Tom Stieghorst & Glenn Singer, Insurance Regulators Shut Down Fort Lauderdale, Fla., Viaticals Firm, SUNSENTINEL, May 6, 2004, at 1A. One year later, perhaps in light of the Mutual Benefits situation, the
Florida legislature unanimously passed legislation empowering the Department of Financial Services to
regulate viaticals as securities. Helgeson, supra note 35.
203Mutual

Benefits III, 408 F.3d 737, 740 (11th Cir. 2005). The SEC filed an action against MBC
seeking “injunctive and other relief” for violations of securities laws. Id. MBC filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that a federal court did not have the power to
adjudicate the dispute because its product did not fall within the purview of the securities laws. Id. at
738. However, the district court held that viatical settlements constituted “investment contracts.” Id.
at 741. The court entered a temporary restraining order and appointed a receiver for MBC. Id. The
district court ordered a magistrate judge to conduct evidentiary hearings. See SEC v. Mut. Benefits
Corp., No. 04-60573-CIV-MORENO/GARBER, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 10, 2004) (hereinafter “Mutual Benefits II”). After hearing evidence from both sides, over the
course of a month, the magistrate judge recommended that the court grant the SEC’s motion. Id. at
*79.
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Peter Lombardi.204 From 1994 to 2004, over 30,000 people invested, in the
aggregate, more than $1 billion in MBC’s viatical settlement scheme.205 MBC would
find terminally ill individuals, negotiate a purchase price, bid on the policy, and
recruit doctors to perform life expectancy evaluations.206 On the investor front,
MBC solicited funds from potential investors, placed those funds in an escrow
account, and then purchased insurance policies with the funds.207 Once it closed on
a policy, MBC would pay the policy premiums and monitor the health of the
insured.208 MBC would also collect and distribute the death benefits.209 MBC
profited by negotiating one price with the viator and then selling fractional interests
to investors at a “marked-up” price.210
MBC promoted its product nationwide through a network of independent
sales agents, in-house sales agents, newspapers, direct mailings, and seminars.211 The
204 Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1338. In 1998, the SEC brought an action against Joel and
Leslie Steinger, claiming that, from October 1994 through April 1996, the Steinger brothers had
misled investors in selling them $100 million worth of viatical settlements. Danner I, supra note 51.
“The Stiengers were ordered to give up $850,000 and [each] pay a $50,000 civil penalty.” Id.; see also
Singer & Stieghorst, supra note 15. Shortly after filing charges against Mutual Benefits in 2004, David
Nelson, head of SERO, told the Miami Herald, “‘That’s what makes this scheme particularly
galling…. At or about the time they settled with us [in 1996], they were continuing’” to sell
unregistered securities. Danner I, supra note 51. In 1996, pursuant to the settlement, the brothers
were no longer allowed to run MBC and could only act as consultants. Singer & Stieghorst, supra note
15. According to the SEC, however, the brothers “remained principals of the company, setting policy
and controlling funds.” Id.
205

Mutual Benefits II, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008, at *7.

206

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 738.

207

Id. at 738-39.

208

Id.

209

Id. at 739.

210

Id.

Mutual Benefits II, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008, at *19. MBC promoted its products to investors
nationwide. See Singer & Stieghorst, supra note 15. Because of these questionable sales practices,
MBC has faced scrutiny “in nearly a dozen states over the past six years.” Id. In 1999, a complaint
was filed against MBC in Indiana requiring the company to register with the state securities
department. Id. The following year Alaska and Alabama took action, “followed in 2001 by Kansas,
Virginia and Vermont, in 2002 by Ohio, in 2003 by Pennsylvania, Arizona and Iowa,” and finally in
2004 by Colorado. Id.
211

2005]

VIATICAL SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY

35

investor would enter a purchase agreement with MBC, which gave the investor seven
return rate choices.212 MBC’s sales agents guaranteed these rates because, according
to information provided to them by MBC, “70-80% of the viatical
settlements…matured–i.e., the viators died–on or before the viators’ projected life
expectancies.”213
MBC made other questionable representations to potential investors. It
claimed that each policy was reviewed by a state-licensed doctor who verified the
viator’s terminal illness and made a life expectancy determination before MBC bought
the policy.214 It explained that the high, fixed rates of return were not subject to the
volatility of the stock market and that viaticals were a safe investment.215 MBC also
focused on the humanitarian aspects of the investment while steering away from the
investment’s risks.216
The medical advances in the mid-1990s dramatically affected MBC’s
business.217 MBC’s practice was to bid on AIDS policies immediately, without the
benefit of an independent medical evaluation.218 Although MBC claimed to have

Mutual Benefits II, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008, at *19. For example, an investor could chose “‘a
12% fixed, total return on purchase price’” within twelve months, “‘a 28% fixed, total return on
purchase price’” within twenty-four months, or “‘a 72% fixed, total return on purchase price’” within
seventy-two months. Id. at *19-20; Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 739. The investor simply chose the
most appealing percentage. Mutual Benefits II, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008, at *19–20.
212

213

Mutual Benefits II, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008, at *20–21.

214

Id. at *21.

215

Id. at *21-22.

Id. at *21. In reality, the statistics regarding rates of return were nowhere near what MBC claimed.
Id. at *36–39. In November 2003, 90% of active AIDS policies were beyond the life expectancies
predicted by MBC. Id. at *29. From 1994 to 2004, MBC bought approximately 1,000 policies from
patients with terminal illnesses other than AIDS. Id. at *36. As of June 2004, 66% of the non-AIDS
policies had already passed their predicted maturation date. Id. at *38. By the time all of these policies
have matured, 85% of the insureds could be beyond their life expectancies. Id. In dollars, “by the
time all of the non-AIDS policies have matured, up to 94.7% (approximately $1.0435 billion) of the
values of those policies could be beyond their life expectancies.” Id. at *39.
216

217

Id. at *33.

218

Id. at *29.
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stopped selling AIDS policies after 2000, there was evidence that it sold 700 AIDS
policies between 2000 and 2003.219
Even with the knowledge of the medical advancements, MBC did not adjust
its life expectancy predictions accordingly.220 It did not inform potential investors of
the new treatments’ effects on the viatical industry.221 It comforted current investors
by saying that the treatments were not universally effective.222 Paradoxically, in
response to former investors’ complaints regarding the late maturation of their
investments, MBC explained that the new AIDS treatments caused the policies’ late
maturation.223
MBC’s practices regarding life expectancy evaluations were also problematic.
MBC bid on AIDS policies based on the insured’s T-cell count.224 After the viator
accepted the offer, MBC would complete the transaction with the insured.225 Next,
MBC “match[ed] the policy to investors.”226 Lastly, MBC’s in-house doctors
reviewed the viator’s medical records and prepared a written summary.227 After
219

Id. at *33.

Id. at *34. In fact, MBC sent potential investors articles in which these new medical treatments
were discredited. Id. at *35. Understandably, many current investors began complaining that they
were not realizing their promised rates of return. Id. at *36.
220

221

Id. at *34-35.

222

Id. at *35

223

Id.

224 Id. at *29. T–cells play an integral part in the human immune system and are attacked by the HIV
virus. This causes the number of T–cells to decrease in patients with HIV and AIDS, making it more
difficult for these individuals to combat illness.
AIDS.org, Fact Sheets, at
http://www.aids.org/factSheets/124-T-Cell-Tests.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
225

Mutual Benefits II, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008, at *29.

226

Id.

Id. at *29-30. Dr. Mitchell, who was hired by MBC in 1996, would send investors a letter or
notarized affidavit that he had signed. Id. at *30. The affidavit included the life expectancy of the
viator. Id. Dr. Mitchell was arrested in May 2004 and charged with Medicaid fraud, unrelated to his
part in the MBC scheme. Patrick Danner, Testimony Begins in Case Against Mutual Benefits, MIAMI
HERALD, July 1, 2004, at 3C (hereinafter “Danner II”). If convicted he could receive a sentence of up
to 150 years in prison. Id. Dr. Mitchell admitted that even though he did not speak with the viator’s
227
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MBC’s closing coordinator received the medical evaluation, he or she “would
prepare the life expectancy letter or affidavit” for the doctor to sign.228 MBC
required that the life expectancy letter date back to the time MBC purchased the
policy so that it looked as though MBC did not bid on a policy until its doctor had
evaluated the viator and made a life expectancy prediction.229
Because many policies were not maturing on time, MBC faced the problem
of having to pay premiums for a longer period of time than expected.230 The
company assured investors that a reserve account existed to pay premiums after a
given life expectancy date had passed.231 In reality, MBC used the money it received
from new investors to pay premiums for older policies.232 In other words, “MBC’s
ability to continue to make premium payments…depend[ed] on MBC’s ability to
bring in new investors.”233 The Eleventh Circuit described MBC’s operation as a
Ponzi Scheme.234
C. Eleventh and D.C. Circuit Application of Howey
The Eleventh and D.C. Circuits applied Howey to a similar set of facts.235
Nevertheless, the two courts came to opposite conclusions.236 Mutual Benefits begins
doctor, in his letter to investors he claimed to have done so. Mutual Benefits II, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23008, at *30. Mitchell testified that he was not comfortable with this arrangement and made his
feelings known to Joel Steinger. Id. Mitchell claims that Mr. Steinger “told him to continue to
execute the letters and affidavits as they were written.” Id.
228

Mutual Benefits II, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008, at *31.

229Id.
230

Id. at *43.

231

Id. at *42.

232

Id. at *43.

233

Id.

234 Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d 737, 741 (11th Cir. 2005). This scheme is named after Charles Ponzi,
“the organizer of such a scheme in the U.S. [in] 1919-20.” RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 1049 (4th ed. 1996). The term “Ponzi” is defined as “a swindle in which a quick return
on an initial investment paid out of funds from new investors lures the victim into bigger risks.” Id.
235

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d 737; Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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with a discussion of the history of the Securities Acts and their primary purpose:
“‘to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name they
are called.’”237 Because most courts applying Howey begin their analyses with the
historical background of the Securities Acts,238 the D.C. Circuit’s failure to preface its
discussion with this information stands out.239 Obviously, courts are not required to
follow a certain structure when interpreting securities laws, but the majority of courts
has done just that.240 Because the D.C. Circuit chose to stray from this accepted
structure, the Life Partners decision is an anomaly. Both Mutual Benefits and Life

236

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 745; Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 549.

237Mutual

original)).

Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 742 (quoting SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004) (emphasis in

238 See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990) (providing that courts should interpret
securities law “against the backdrop of what Congress was attempting to accomplish in enacting the
Securities Acts”).

The district court in Mutual Benefits I found for the SEC specifically “in accordance with the
underpinning principles[, namely flexibility,] of the federal securities laws…interpreted time and again
by…the Supreme Court.” Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2004). Courts that
have had to interpret “investment contract” often begin their analyses with the historical context of
the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, followed by an explanation of the underlying legislative intent,
then followed by a discussion of precedent in which courts invoke flexibility. See SEC v. Edwards,
540 U.S. 389, 393–94 (2004) (including a comprehensive explanation of the Securities Acts, underlying
legislative intent, and precedent in which courts have stressed flexibility); United Hous. Found. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (beginning the analysis with the purposes underlying the Securities
Acts of 1933 and 1934 and including the doctrine that form should be ignored in favor of economic
reality); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335–38 (1967) (discussing the Securities Acts, the
legislative intent that securities laws not be narrowly interpreted, and the Howey Court’s directive that
its test is meant to be flexible); SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (including in its analysis
the Securities Acts, legislative intent, and the flexibility used by state courts when interpreting the term
“investment contract”); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479–80 (5th Cir. 1974)
(beginning with an explanation of Congress’ intent regarding the securities laws, followed by a detailed
discussion of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Howey); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d
476, 480 n.4, 481 (9th Cir. 1973) (beginning the discussion with the definition of “security,” followed
by legislative intent in favor of a broad application, and citing precedent in which courts have stressed
flexibility) . Other cases in which the analysis follows a similar structure include Rodriguez v. Banco
Cent. Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1993); SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., Inc., 952 F.2d 1125, 1130
(9th Cir. 1991); Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, 756 F.2d 230, 237–38 (2d Cir. 1985);
Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027, 1034 (2d Cir. 1974).
239

240

See cases cited supra note 239.
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Partners, however, separate the prongs of the Howey test and apply each to the facts at
hand.241
1. “In a common enterprise”
Both circuits deemed the commonality prong satisfied.242 In Life Partners, the
D.C. Circuit applied the horizontal commonality test.243 The investors’ money was
pooled when LPI brought together a group of investors, each of whom purchased a
fractional interest in a life insurance policy.244 If an insured died prior to the
expected date, all of the investors received a higher return.245 The investors also
shared the risk that the insured might live longer than predicted.246 Because all three
elements of horizontal commonality were satisfied, the court determined that the
commonality requirement was met.247 The D.C. Circuit saw no need to determine
whether vertical commonality existed.248

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 742–43; Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 542. The Eleventh Circuit
quickly addressed the first three prongs explaining that “[t]here is no genuine dispute here that there
was (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) involving an expectation of profits.”
Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 742-43. Because the Eleventh Circuit was satisfied with the district
court’s holding with respect to these elements, the court turned to the issue at hand, namely “whether
the investor’s expectation of profits is based ‘solely on the efforts of the promoter or a third party.’”
Id. at 743. The D.C. Circuit focused on only three elements: “(1) an expectation of profits arising
from (2) a common enterprise that (3) depends upon the efforts of others.” Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d
at 542.
241

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 742-43; Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 544. The three elements of
horizontal commonality are “(1) pooling of investors’ resources; (2) profit sharing among the
investors; and (3) loss sharing among the investors.” Luxenberg, supra note 113, at 365.

242

243

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 544.

244

Id. at 543-44.

245

Id. at 543.

246

Id.

247

Id. at 544.

248

Id.
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In the Mutual Benefits district court decision, Judge Moreno explained that the
Eleventh Circuit requires only vertical commonality.249 With vertical commonality, it
is only necessary that the success of the investor(s) and promoter be intertwined.250
It is not a prerequisite that the investors’ profits be connected.251 In Mutual Benefits,
the “investors’ return [was] highly dependent on MBC’s efforts because the investors
rel[ied] on MBC’s skill in locating, negotiating, bidding, and evaluating policies.”252
Based on these facts, the court deemed the commonality requirement satisfied.253
2. “Based on a reasonable expectation of profits”
As with commonality, both circuits held that individuals invested their
money in the hopes of receiving a monetary return.254 In Life Partners, the court,
following Forman, correctly determined that the investor expected to receive a
financial return.255 The D.C. Circuit accurately noted that “[t]he buyer [was]
obviously purchasing not for consumption—unmatured claims cannot be currently
consumed—but rather for the prospect of a return on his investment.”256
3. Derived from the entrepreneurial and managerial efforts of others
The Eleventh and D.C. Circuits took different paths regarding the “efforts of
others” prong.257 In Life Partners, the court followed the broad interpretation of the
word “solely,” requiring only that profit-generating activities come “‘predominantly’
249

Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2004).

250

Id.

251

See id.

252

Id.

253

Id.

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d 737, 742-43 (11th Cir. 2005); Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d 536, 543
(D.C. Cir. 1996).

254

255

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 543.

256

Id.

257

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 743-45; Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 545-48.
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from the efforts of others.”258 The court went on to separate entrepreneurial and
managerial efforts from ministerial efforts, declaring the latter irrelevant.259 Finally,
the court concluded that “post-purchase entrepreneurial activities are the ‘efforts of
others’ most obviously relevant to the question whether a promoter is selling a
‘security.’”260 After making this statement, however, the court failed to cite any
precedent to support its assertion.261 According to its reasoning, pre-purchase
entrepreneurial and managerial efforts alone are never enough to satisfy this prong.262
In order for a given scheme to constitute an investment contract, there must be
some significant post-purchase services.263 The court then applied this new bright-line
test to the facts before it.264
First, the court determined whether LPI’s post-purchase activities were
managerial or entrepreneurial in nature.265 In Version I, because LPI was named as
the policy owner and beneficiary, investors relied “on LPI’s continuing to deal
honestly with them.”266 The court found that LPI would have had to engage in
criminal conduct or fail “to perform its post-purchase ministerial functions” in order
to impede investor profits.267 This type of conduct did not satisfy the “efforts of
others” prong because it was “not the sort of entrepreneurial exertions that the
Howey Court” envisioned.268

258

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 545.

259

Id. at 545-46.

260

Id. at 545 (emphasis added).

261

See id.

262

Id. at 548.

263

Id. at 545-46.

264

Id.

265

Id.

266

Id. at 545

267

Id.

268

Id.
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In Version II, the court found that the post-purchase services offered by LPI
were purely ministerial.269 It held that LPI’s “assistance” did not add to or take away
from an investor’s potential profits.270 Version III contained no post-purchase
activities to which the court could look for entrepreneurial efforts.271 In conclusion,
the court determined that LPI did not engage in any significant non-ministerial
activities after the sale of the policy.272 Therefore, the three versions at issue did not
constitute securities.273 According to the holding, combining the managerial and
entrepreneurial pre-purchase efforts with the ministerial post-purchase efforts did
not satisfy the “efforts of others” prong.274 The basis for the court’s conclusion was
that investor profits depended “entirely upon the mortality of the insured.”275
269

Id. at 545-46.

Id. at 546. The court had to overcome case precedent such as Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v.
Merrill Lynch, 756 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985), in which the Second Circuit reasoned that a promoter’s
offering to buy back the investor’s interest satisfied the “efforts of others” prong. Id. at 240. The
D.C. Circuit held that the facts in Life Partners II were distinguishable because there was no evidence
that investors sought to liquidate their policies and because LPI warned clients that resale
opportunities were not guaranteed. Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 546.
270

271

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 546.

Id. To support its decision that pre-purchase efforts, regardless of their nature, were irrelevant, the
court cited Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980) and McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d
204 (10th Cir. 1975)). Id. In Noa, the promoter’s pre-purchase services included purchasing silver
from a specific seller and then refining the silver to achieve the proper purity. Noa, 638 F.2d at 79.
The D.C. Circuit likened the Noa promoter’s pre-purchase selection process to that of LPI. Life
Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 547. In Noa, the court held that investor profits depended on “fluctuations [in]
the silver market, not the managerial efforts of” the promoter. Noa, 638 F.2d at 79. In McCown, the
Tenth Circuit found that the purchase of land was potentially transformed into a security due to the
post-purchase services promised by the promoter. McCown, 527 F.2d at 211. The D.C. Circuit
apparently found that, because both the Noa and McCown courts regarded pre-purchase efforts as
insignificant, it could not base a finding of an investment contract solely on pre-purchase
entrepreneurial and managerial efforts. Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 547. The dissent did not find
these cases to support the majority’s bright-line test. Id. at 553–54 (Wald, J., dissenting). The dissent
argued that the profits in Noa and McCown were dependent upon market forces and not pre- or postpurchase efforts of the promoter. Id. at 553. With viatical settlements, however, investor profits
depend not upon the market but upon the promoter’s efforts, which happen to occur primarily prior
to closing. Id. at 555.
272

273

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 548.

274

Id. at 549.

275

Id. at 548.
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The SEC filed a petition for rehearing, and the D.C. Circuit responded by
reiterating that LPI’s pre- and post-purchase services combined did not satisfy the
“efforts of others” requirement.276 The court asserted that its prior holding neither
established an “‘artificial bright-line’ rule”277 nor deemed all pre-purchase efforts
irrelevant.278 The court went on to explain that its holding required only “‘that [1]
pre-purchase services cannot by themselves suffice to make the profits of an
investment arise predominantly from the efforts of others, and that [2] ministerial
functions should receive a good deal less weight than entrepreneurial activities.’”279
The SEC did not appeal the decision to the Supreme Court.
In Mutual Benefits, both the Eleventh Circuit and the district court declined
the defendant’s invitation to follow the D.C. Circuit’s holding.280 The courts
explained that the bright-line rule adopted in Life Partners did not comport with the
underlying purpose of the securities laws, namely, looking past form to the economic
reality of the arrangement.281 The Eleventh Circuit held that although the fourth
“prong of the Howey test is more easily satisfied by post-purchase activities, there is
no basis for excluding pre-purchase managerial activities from the analysis.”282
In Mutual Benefits I, the district court’s Judge Moreno changed the issue’s
focus from whether the investor’s profit is dependent upon the promoter’s efforts to
“whether profits are derived from the activities of the promoter or rather, the
operation of external market forces beyond the control of the promoter.”283 The
reason for making this “distinction is because the securities laws disclosure
requirements will only protect investments that depend on the efforts of promoters,
276

SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 102 F.3d 587, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

277

Id.

278

Id.

279

Id. (quoting Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 548).

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d 737, 743 (11th Cir. 2005); Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337,
1343 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 2004).

280

281

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 743 (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1969)).

282

Id. at 743 (citing Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 551 (Wald, J., dissenting)).

283

Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.

44

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 7

not those that depend on the operation of external market forces.”284 In the case at
bar, market forces had no bearing on profits.285 In fact, MBC regularly included in
its promotional materials the fact that the investment was free from the uncertainty
associated with the stock market.286 The court held that the promoter’s expertise in
choosing policies—not outside market forces—determined investor profits.287
The Eleventh Circuit advocated a review of all activities, both pre- and postpurchase, when deciding whether the fourth prong is satisfied.288 In holding that
MBC’s efforts satisfied the fourth prong, the court highlighted a long list of activities
performed by the promoter, including selecting and bidding on insurance policies,
negotiating with viators, and evaluating life expectancy.289 The court also noted that
the investor had little or no ability to assess the accuracy of MBC’s analysis.290
Even though the facts in Mutual Benefits could be distinguished from those in
Life Partners, the appellate court stressed that viatical settlement agreements
constituted investment contracts regardless of the timing of the promoter’s
activities.291 The court held that MBC’s scheme constituted an investment contract
“[w]hether the investors were offered a longer or shorter window in which to
withdraw funds from escrow, whether the life-expectancy evaluation was actually
284

Id. (citing SEC v. G. Weeks Sec., Inc., 678 F.2d 649, 652 (6th Cir. 1982)).

285

Id.

Mutual Benefits II, No. 04-60573-CIV-MORENO/GARBER, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008, at
*22-23 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2004).

286

287

Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.

288

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d 737, 743-44 (11th Cir. 2005).

289

Id. at 744.

290 Id. As explained in Williamson v. Tucker, when the “agreement among the parties leaves…little
power in the hands of the [investor who]…is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business
affairs that he is incapable of intelligently exercising [any] powers,” the fourth prong is most likely
satisfied. 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981).
291 Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 744-45. The SEC argued, in the alternative, that if the court adopted
the D.C. Circuit’s bright-line rule, MBC’s post-purchase entrepreneurial and managerial efforts would
still satisfy the “efforts of others” prong. Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1343 n.8. The district
court chose not to distinguish the case at bar and instead held that “[b]ecause the Court declines to
follow Life Partners, the Court need not reach the issue of timing.” Id..
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performed before or after closing, and despite certain differences in how premiums
were paid.”292 The court also noted that investors “relied on the pre- and postpurchase [entrepreneurial and] managerial efforts of MBC.”293 The Eleventh Circuit
refused to distinguish these facts from those in Life Partners even though they could
easily have done so.294 The court instead went one step further and rejected the D.C.
Circuit’s formulistic bright-line test.295
V. OTHER COURTS RESPOND TO LIFE PARTNERS
Although the D.C. Circuit was the only federal appellate court to decide this
issue for ten years, many lower courts, both state and federal, were called on to
determine whether viatical settlements constitute investment contracts. Although
none of these courts was bound by Life Partners, many addressed the decision and
either distinguished its facts or refused to follow its holding.296
In the 2001 case of Siporin v. Carrington,297 the Arizona Court of Appeals
declined to apply the bright-line rule established by the Life Partners court.298 In
Siporin, the plaintiff brought a claim under state securities law.299 The court explained
292

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 744-45.

293

Id. at 745.

294

See id.

295

Id. at 743.

296Thus

far there have been no decisions at the district court level in the D.C. Circuit regarding
whether a viatical settlement agreement constitutes an investment contract.
297

23 P.3d 92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).

298

Id. at 99.

Id. at 93. For purposes of this article, the relevant portion of the state statute is the section that
includes the definition of “security.” In Siporin, because the viatical settlements were sold in 1999, the
court had to determine “whether the viatical settlements sold by Carrington qualified as a security
under the general category of ‘investment contracts’ within the meaning of section 44-1801(23)” of
the Arizona Securities Act. Id. at 96 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1801(23) (West 1999)
(amended 2000)). At the time of the decision, the Arizona securities laws had been amended to
expressly include “viatical or life settlement investment contract” within the definition of a “security.”
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1801(26) (West 2003).
299
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that the definition of “security” under section 44-1801 of the Arizona Securities Act
“is virtually the same as that contained in the federal Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.”300 Therefore, the court “look[ed] to the
federal courts for guidance.”301
The Siporin court explained that the investors’ profits were predominantly
dependent upon the viatical company’s expertise in selecting policies and predicting
insureds’ life expectancies.302 The court separated the promoter’s responsibilities
into three categories: estimating life expectancy, analyzing the policy, and closing the
deal.303 First, the promoter reviewed the viator’s medical records, gauged whether
the viator was truthful regarding his or her condition, hired medical experts to
evaluate the viator’s condition, and reviewed all potential medical treatments that
could affect life expectancy.304 Second, the promoter analyzed the insurance policy
to determine whether the death benefits would be paid.305 In doing this, the
promoter determined whether the policy would be contested by other beneficiaries,
whether the policy was assignable, whether the policy was a group policy, and
whether the insurance company was economically viable.306 Finally, in closing the
deal, the promoter negotiated with the viator, marketed fractional interests to retail
investors, ensured premiums were paid to prevent the policy from lapsing, and
timely claimed death benefits for investors.307 The court concluded that, “[a]lthough
it is the viator’s death that ultimately yields a return, the profitability of the return
depends almost exclusively on the viatical seller’s entrepreneurial pre-closing
investigations, analyses, and negotiations in selecting the viator and the policy.”308
300

Siporin, 23 P.3d at 96.

301

Id.

302

Id. at 97.

303

Id.

304

Id.

305Id.
306

Id.

307

Id.

308

Id.
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The court declined the defendant’s invitation to follow Life Partners for
several reasons.309 First, the Life Partners court disregarded the Howey test’s underlying
rationale, that legislative intent dictates that the statutory definition of “security”
embodies a flexible, not static, principle.310 The court also pointed out a
contradiction in the Life Partners decision. The D.C. Circuit first accepted the flexible
and realistic rule which replaced “solely” with “predominantly” but then proceeded
to establish “an even more inflexible” rule, namely the bright-line test.311 Finally, the
court noted that “[n]either Howey nor any federal securities decision lends anything
more than tangential support for the bright-line rule set forth in Life Partners.”312 In
the years following the Siporin decision, many other state and federal courts declined
to follow Life Partners. Most of these decisions included the Arizona court’s
reasoning in their analyses.
Three decisions from the Indiana Court of Appeals followed the Siporin
court’s holding and reasoning. In Poyser v. Flora,313 the defendant was sued for failing
to comply with Indiana securities laws.314 In rejecting the Life Partners decision, the
Poyser court reiterated the Siporin court’s insistence upon applying Howey flexibly.315
The same year, in Security Trust Corp. v. Estate of Fisher,316 another Indiana appellate
court followed the Poyser court’s decision.317 In declining to follow Life Partners, the
309

Id. at 99.

310

Id.

311

Id.

312

Id.

313

780 N.E.2d 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

314 Id. at 1192. The dispute was based on a viatical settlement sale that occurred in 1997; therefore the
suit was brought under the prior version of section 23-2-1-1 of the Indiana Code. Id. at 1192, 1194
(citing IND. CODE § 23-2-1-1(k) (West 1999)). Section 23-2-1-1(k) defines “security” as “a note,
stock, treasury stock…[or an] investment contract.” The court cited a Seventh Circuit opinion that
applied Indiana law and noted “the identical terms under the Securities Act[s]…and the Indiana ‘Blue
Sky’ Act.” Poyser, 780 N.E.2d at 1194–95 (citing Am. Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. U.S. Steel Credit Corp.,
635 F.2d 1247, 1253 (7th Cir. 1980)). The Indiana statute was amended in 2000 to include viatical
settlements. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k) (West Supp. 2004).
315

Poyser, 780 N.E.2d at 1197 (citing Siporin, 23 P.3d at 98).

316

797 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

317

Id. at 795 (citing Poyser, 780 N.E.2d 1191).
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Fisher court summarized the Siporin court’s reasoning.318 Finally, in Accelerated Benefits
Corp. v. Peaslee,319 the Indiana Court of Appeals held that “the success of [the
investor’s] viatical settlement investment was dependent upon the [promoter’s]
expertise in choosing which life insurance policies to purchase.”320 The Peaslee court
did not mention Life Partners, but it did explain that it was following the holdings of
Poyser and Fisher.321 Because both of those decisions rejected Life Partners, the Peaslee
court also declined to accept the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning.322
In Joseph v. Viatica Management,323 the Colorado Court of Appeals also
followed the Siporin court’s reasoning when it rejected Life Partners.324 In Joseph, the
insurance policies were purchased after the investment was made.325 Although the
court noted that it could distinguish the facts in Joseph from those in Life Partners, it
went further by noting that it was “not persuaded by either the rationale or
conclusions reached” in Life Partners.326

Id. at 795–97 (citing Poyser, 780 N.E.2d at 1195–97). Fisher arose from a 1998 viatical agreement.
Id. at 791. Like in Poyser, the Fisher court had to determine “[w]hether viatical settlements were subject
to the Indiana Securities Act at the time of sale” and, more specifically, “whether the viatical
settlement at issue [was] an ‘investment contract.’” Id.
318

319

818 N.E.2d 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

Id. at 76. In Peaslee, the plaintiff entered into viatical settlement agreements in 1997 and 1998. Id.
at 74. Therefore, the court relied on the appropriate version of the Indiana securities laws. Id at 7576 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k)).

320

321

Id. at 76-77 (citing Fisher, 797 N.E.2d at 797; Poyser, 780 N.E. 2d at 1196).

322

Id. at 77.

323

55 P.3d 264 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Id. at 267. (citing Siporin v. Carrington, 23 P.3d 92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)). The plaintiff brought
the suit under Colorado’s securities laws. Id. at 266 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-201(17) (2001)
(amended 2005)). The court explained that the “provisions and rules under the [Colorado Securities]
Act shall be coordinated with federal acts and statutes to the extent consistent with the purposes of
the Act[,]…[which] is remedial in nature and is to be broadly construed to effectuate its purposes.”
Id. at 267 (citing § 11-51-101).
324

325

Joseph, 55 P.3d at 265.

326

Id. at 267
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In holding that viatical settlements are securities, a Michigan Court of
Appeals adopted the Siporin holding “that ‘the Life Partners rationale does not serve
the prophylactic and remedial purposes of the [securities] laws.”327 The court further
supported its argument with evidence that several state legislatures had recently
added the term “viatical settlement agreement” to their definitions of “security.”328
In addition, the court gave deference to the view of the Michigan Department of
Commerce’s Corporation and Securities Bureau that viatical settlements constituted
securities.329
Conversely, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that viatical settlements were
not securities in Glick v. Sokol.330 The plaintiff in Glick was an investor who claimed
that his financial advisor had violated state securities laws.331 The plaintiff did not
327 Michelson v. Voison, 658 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Siporin, 23 P.3d at 99.
The defendants were sued under the Michigan Uniform Securities Act (the “Michigan Act”), Id. at
189 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.501 et seq. (2003)), which provides that it “‘shall be so construed
as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to
coordinate the interpretation and administration of this act with the related federal regulation.’” Id. at
190 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.815 (2003)). Accordingly, the Michelson court stated that it was
“appropriate to consider other state and federal decisions.” Id. Section 451.801(z) of the Michigan
Act defines “security.” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.801(z) (West 2005).
328

Michelson, 658 N.W.2d at 190-91 & nn.6-8.

329

Id. at 191.

777 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002). The court explained that an investment constitutes a
security if it meets the following conditions:

330

“(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and (2) a portion of
this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and (3) the
furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror’s promises or
representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a
valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue
to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and (4) the
offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control
over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.”
Id. at 318 (quoting State v. George, 362 N.E.2d 1223, 1227–28 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975)).
331 Id. at 316-17. Because the plaintiff entered into the viatical settlement agreement in 1998, the
defendant was sued under the prior version of the Ohio securities laws. Id. at 317–18 (citing OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (West 1998) (amended 2000)). The previous section 1707.01(B)
included the term “investment contract” in the definition of “security.” § 1707(B). The statute was
amended in 2000 to include “life settlement” in the definition of “security.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1707.01(B) (West 2005).
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bring the action against the viatical settlement provider, Liberte Capital Group, even
though the viatical settlement agreement was between the plaintiff and Liberte
Capital.332 In addition, a manager at Liberte Capital signed all correspondence
regarding the investment.333 In reaching its conclusion, the court refused to accept
the Ohio Division of Securities’ view that viatical settlements constitute investment
contracts subject to its regulation.334 Similar to Life Partners, the court held that “the
only variable that can impact the profitability of the viatical settlements at issue is the
timing of the death of the insured.”335 The court noted that if “the viatical
companies constitute an enterprise, the…analysis appears to apply to Liberte Capital
and not to” the defendants.336 The Glick court’s flawed reasoning was highlighted in
Wuliger v. Christie.337 The Christie court asserted that “[i]f the viatical investment was
deemed to be a security based upon Liberte’s conduct/actions, its status would not
change in a suit against Liberte’s agent.”338
332

Glick, 777 N.E.2d at 316, 319.

333

Id. at 319.

334

Id.

Id. The court did not mention Life Partners but came to the same conclusion. Id.; see Life Partners
IV, 87 F.3d 536, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that “the only variable affecting profits is the timing of
the insured’s death”). A Texas state court also agreed with the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Life Partners in
Griffitts v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 10-01-00271-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 4844, at *6 (May 26,
2004) (citing Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 545-45). The plaintiff in Griffitts sued under state securities
laws. Id. at *13 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A) (Vernon Supp. 2005)). The court
stated that the “definition of ‘security’ includes, in relevant part, ‘any . . . note . . . or other evidence of
indebtedness, . . . [or] investment contract.’” Id. at *3. (citing art. 581-4(A)). The court dismissed the
defendant’s pre-purchase efforts and found that only ministerial efforts were made after closing. Id. at
*5–6. The court cited Life Partners in concluding that “profitability…[was] not determined by any
managerial efforts…but [was] determined by the mortality of the insureds.” Id. (citing Life Partners IV,
87 F.3d at 545–46). The court applied the bright-line rule and quickly dismissed the plaintiff’s
argument. Id. This is exactly what the dissent in Life Partners warned against. Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d
at 551 (Wald, J., dissenting). The Life Partners dissent asserted that the majority’s new rule will make it
simple for courts to determine whether an investment contract existed, but only at the expense of
flexibility. Id. One member of the Griffitts court dissented, stating that “viatical settlement
contracts…are securities under the…Howey four-pronged test.” Griffitts, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 4844,
at *11 (Vance, J. dissenting).
335

336

Glick, 777 N.E.2d at 319.

337

310 F. Supp. 2d 897, 906 (N.D. Ohio 2004).

338

Id.
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The following year, in Rumbaugh v. Ohio Department of Commerce, 339 the Ohio
Court of Appeals affirmed the state securities department’s view340 and
simultaneously rejected the Glick court’s holding.341 Rumbaugh is similar to Life
Partners in that the securities department—this time on the state level—brought an
action against a promoter for selling unregistered securities.342 The Rumbaugh court
also cited Siporin, Poyser, and Michelson as support for its declining to follow Life
Partners.343
In Wuliger v. Christie,344 a federal district court in the Sixth Circuit did not find
the Life Partners reasoning persuasive.345 The court noted that, “[w]hile the decision
in Life Partners [sic] is characterized as having been largely unchallenged, it is perhaps
a more accurate assessment to state that it has not altogether been embraced by
other circuits and continues to generate much discussion in the academic realm.”346
The court held that economic reality dictated against a strict construction of Howey
339

800 N.E.2d 780 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).

Id. at 784 (holding “that courts must defer to an agency's administrative interpretation[,]
particularly when that agency is empowered to enforce the statute at issue”) (citing Leon v. Ohio Bd.
of Psychology, 590 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Ohio 1992)).
340

341

Id. at 784 (citing Glick, 777 N.E.2d at 319).

Id. at 783. As in Glick, the plaintiff in Rumbaugh sued under state securities laws. Id. at 783–84
(citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (West Supp. 2002)). The court explained that “viatical
settlement contracts are now regulated by the division[,]…[but in 1998] at the time of the allegations
against Rumbaugh, the definition [of “security”] did not expressly include ‘life settlement interests.’”
Id. (citing § 1707.01(B) (West 1998) (amended 2000)).
342

Id. at 785-86 (citing Siporin v. Carrington, 23 P.3d 92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Poyser v. Flora, 780
N.E.2d 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Michelson v. Voison, 658 N.W.2d 188 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)).

343

310 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Ohio 2004). Wuliger was appointed Receiver of Alpha Capital Group,
LLC, in 2001 and of Liberte Capital in 2002. Id. at 900. Both companies are viatical settlement
providers. Id. As Receiver, Wuliger was “empowered to represent and pursue the interests of the
investors directly.” Id. Christie acted as a sales agent for Alpha and solicited individuals to invest in
viatical settlements. Id. Because this dispute came before a federal court, the federal securities laws
applied. Id. at 902 (citing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)). Christie is the
first decision related to Liberte Capital Group v. Capwill, 229 F. Supp. 2d 799 (N.D. Ohio 2002), in
which a court held that viatical settlements constitute securities. Id. at 908.
344

345

Id. at 907.

346

Id. at 904.
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and that a more flexible construction was necessary to keep promoters from
manipulating their schemes to avoid securities laws.347 In conclusion, the court
found that “it is not the date of the viator’s death which establishes the success of
the investment but the selection by the promoter of the policy…based upon its
expertise in assessing the viator’s life expectancy.”348 Christie is an outgrowth of
Liberte Capital Group v. Capwill,349 which has spawned litigation in both state and
federal courts.350 In Wuliger v. Mann,351 the most recent related decision, the court
cited the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Mutual Benefits as support for its holding that
viatical settlements constituted securities.352
In SEC v. Tyler,353 the federal court in the northern district of Texas
distinguished the facts at hand from those in the Life Partners.354 One factor that the
Life Partners court found significant in refusing to deem the “efforts of others” prong
satisfied was the fact that there was no established market for the resale of policies.355
In Tyler, the promoter “created a liquid market of viatical shares to sell his
investors.”356 If investors wanted to resell their fractional interests, Tyler would
347

Id. at 907.

348

Id.

349

229 F. Supp. 2d 799 (N.D. Ohio 2002).

See Wuliger v. Liberty Bank, No. 3:02 CV 1378, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27353, at *1 (N.D. Ohio
Mar. 4, 2004). In Liberty Bank, the court noted that, “[a]s of the last count, there are over one
hundred and fifty related civil actions pending in the Northern District of Ohio as well as a number of
state related cases.” Id. at *2 n.2. The decisions citing Christie as support in holding that viatical
settlements are securities include Wuliger v. Anstaett, 363 F. Supp. 2d 917, 921 (N.D. Ohio 2005) and
Wuliger v. Mann, No. 3:03 CV 1531, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13021, at *10 (N.D. Ohio July 1, 2005).
350

351

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13021.

352

Id. at *13 (citing Mutual Benefits III, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2004)).

353

No. 3:02-CV-0282-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2952 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2002).

Id. at *15–16. The Tyler court applied the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. Id. at *7 (citing 15
U.S.C. § 77t(b) and 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)).

354

355

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d 436, 546.

356

Tyler, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2952, at *6.
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either buy them back or sell them to another investor.357 The court followed the rule
established in Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch,358 which held that “Merrill
Lynch’s post-purchase services and creation of a secondary market satisfied the
[“efforts of others”] prong of the Howey test.”359
Several cases did not mention Life Partners but came to a conclusion opposite
that of the Life Partners court regarding the “efforts of others” prong.360 In Hill v.
Dedicated Resources, Inc.,361 the court held that the promoter’s policy selection process
predominantly determined the investor’s rate of return.362 Interestingly, in finding
the “efforts of others” prong satisfied, the Kansas court cited the lower court’s
decision in Life Partners even though that decision had already been overruled by the
D.C. Circuit.363 Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal also found the Howey test
satisfied in Kligfeld v. State.364 The Florida Office of Financial Regulation alleged that
the defendants were selling unregistered securities.365 The Kligfeld court held that the
defendants’ program satisfied the investment contract requirements set forth in
Howey.366 Finally, in Allen v. Jones,367 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that viatical
357

Id.

358

756 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985).

359

Tyler, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2952, at *17 (citing Gary Plastic, 756 F.2d at 240–41).

See Kligfeld v. State, 876 So. 2d 36, 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Allen v. Jones, 604 S.E.2d 644,
647 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Hill v. Dedicated Res., Inc., No. 99-C-1714, 2000 WL 34001915, at * 1 (Kan.
Dist. Ct. July 12, 2000).

360

361

2000 WL 34001915.

Id. at *3. The plaintiffs brought their suit under state securities laws. Id. at *1-2 (citing KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-1252(j) (Supp. 2004) (amended 2004)). “The Kansas Securities Act defines a ‘security’ as,
‘any note; stock; treasury stock; bond;…[or] investment contract.’” Id. at *2. The state legislature
amended the statute in 2004 by adding “viatical investment” to the definition of “investment
contract.” H.R. 80-2347, Reg. Sess., at 5 (Kan. 2004) (effective July 1, 2005).
362

363

Hill, 2000 WL 34001915, at *3 (citing Life Partners I, 898 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1995)).

876 So. 2d at 38. The court explained that the term “investment contracts” is included in the
definition of “security” under Florida securities law. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ch. 517.021(20)(q) (2003)
(amended 2005)). Florida’s legislature added viatical settlements to the definition of security in 2005.
S. 107-2412, Reg. Sess., at 2 (Fla. 2005).
364

365

Kligfeld, 876 So. 2d at 37.
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settlements are investment contracts under Howey.368 The court did not mention Life
Partners, but it did cite Fisher, which refused to embrace the Life Partners decision.369
VI. PUBLIC POLICY
While the reaction of other courts provides support for the Mutual Benefits
holding, public policy, namely investor protection, also highlights the need for
securities regulation in this industry.370 Much of the media coverage regarding this
industry over the past ten years has been negative. Many articles warn investors of
the many pitfalls associated with the industry.371 One article warned that viaticals are
“peddled to older people as a ‘safe’ investment with a ‘guaranteed’
return[,]…[but]…[t]here has been a lot of fraud in viatical deals[,]…[therefore] buyer
beware.”372 Another article cautioned that, despite the sales pitch promising high
returns, “viaticals are a dangerous business,…[c]heating is rife,…potential returns are
often stated deceptively[, and] [s]everal states have indicted viatical salespeople for

366

Id. at 38.

367

604 S.E.2d 644.

368 Id. at 647. The plaintiffs sued under the Georgia Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization
(RICO) Act, and thus Georgia securities laws applied. Id. at 645-46 & n.5 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §
10-5-2(a)(26) (Supp. 2004)). Because the plaintiffs’ purchases of viatical settlement contracts occurred
in 1998, the court applied the appropriate version of the statute. Id. at 645-46 & n.5 (defining
“security” without including “viatical investment” under GA. CODE. ANN. § 10-5-2(a)(26) (2000)
(amended 2002)).

Allen, 604 S.E.2d at 646 (citing Sec. Trust Corp. v. Estate of Fisher, 797 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003)).

369

The Supreme Court has held that “‘it is proper for a court to consider…policy considerations in
construing terms in’” the Securities Acts. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1988) (quoting Landreth
Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 695 n.7 (1985)).
370

See Jane Bryant Quinn, Assess This Investment’s Health Warily, ALBANY TIMES UNION (N.Y.), May 13,
2001, at C1 (hereinafter “Quinn I”); Jane Bryant Quinn, Steer Clear of ‘Viaticals’? You Bet Your Life,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 19, 2000, at D1 (hereinafter “Quinn II”).

371

372

Quinn I, supra note 371.
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fraud.”373 The Los Angeles Times simply advised its readers to “[a]void [v]iaticals [l]ike
the [p]lague.”374
The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) has
also reached out to potential investors.375 It publishes a list of investment scams each
year.376 Viaticals were in the top ten as recently as 2005.377 Christine Bruenn,
NASAA president in 2003, explained that the problem of scammers preying on
seniors began due to a volatile stock market, record low interest rates, and a threeyear bear market.378 If you “[m]ix all that in with rising medical costs and the fact
that people are living longer[,]…people who are retired…are becoming
desperate[,]…mak[ing] them vulnerable to investment fraud and abuse.”379 Richard
Walker of the SEC spoke at a NASAA training session for broker-dealers in Ft.
Lauderdale and told the audience “that he wanted to ‘draw attention to…areas where
sales practice abuses have clustered of late[,]’…[including t]he sale of…viatical
settlements.”380
During the 2003 “Fight Financial Fraud in Florida Week,” the state unveiled
a list of dangerous investments that included viatical settlements.381 In 2002, the U.S.
373

Quinn II, supra note 371.

Liz Pulliam Weston, Bankruptcy Filing Makes It Tough to Get a Home Loan, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002,
at 3.
374

375

Helen Huntley, Stocks are risky - but you could do worse, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 15, 2005, at 1D.

376

Id.

377

Id.

Michelle Singletary, Scams Target Vulnerable Seniors, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 10, 2003, at C2
(hereinafter Singletary II).

378

Id. In Edwards, the Supreme Court highlighted this particular problem, stating that “investments
pitched as low risk (such as those offering a ‘guaranteed’ fixed return) are particularly attractive to
individuals more vulnerable to investment fraud, including older and less sophisticated investors” like
the investors preyed upon by viatical settlement providers. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. at 389, 394
(2004).
379

380 Humberto Cruz, SEC Official Sounds Fraud Alarm; Brokers Warned About Abusive Selling Tactics, SUNSENTINEL (Fla.), June 22, 2000, at 1D (hereinafter “Cruz II”).

Purva Patel, Financial Con Artists Reap $35M In State; Regulators List Top 10 Scams, SUN-SENTINEL
(Fla.), June 10, 2003, at 1D.
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Department of Banking released “a list of the top five investment scams” that also
included viaticals.382 In addition to these specific examples, “phony viaticals still
place regularly on state regulators’ annual top [ten] lists of investment scams.”383
In 2002, the United States House of Representatives Financial Services
Committee held hearings as a result of investors’ losing “more than $400 million to
viatical frauds” since 1999.384 Stephen B. Mercer, an attorney representing AIDS
patients, testified that despite patients’ needs for funds and his desire for viatical
settlements to provide those funds, “‘no one should be putting a dime into [the
viatical industry].’”385 Mercer went on to explain that, because of its current
structure, the industry is “prone to fraud…[and] encourages middlemen to charge
large commissions.”386
There is much evidence of fraud in the viatical industry, especially after the
medical advancements of the mid-1990s.387 Florida, with its large population of
elderly individuals, has been a breeding ground for dishonest viatical companies.388
Scott Stephan, former owner of Justus Viatical Group LLC, was sent to state prison
for defrauding investors by selling them phony insurance policies.389 Viatical Capital,
Inc., was accused of swindling older investors out of $61 million.390 Top officials of
Future First Financial Group (FFFG) were charged with racketeering and securities
fraud for scamming elderly investors out of $57 million.391 Frederick C. Brandau, a
382

Victoria Lim, Keep Skepticism Handy When Retooling Investments, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 27, 2002, at 1.

383

Cruz I, supra note 36.

384 Kathy M. Kristof, Lawmakers Probe Viatical Fraud, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at 6 (hereinafter
“Kristof II”).
385

Id.

386

Id.

387

Helgeson, supra note 35.

388

Id. “The state estimates that fraud has cost investors $2 billion since 1996.” Id.

Kathy Bushouse, Cost of Fraud: $820 Million; State CFO Unveils Year’s Top 10 Scams, SUN-SENTINEL
(Fla.), June 15, 2004, at 3D (hereinafter “Bushouse II”).
389

390

Sarasota Company’s Assets Frozen, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, SEPT. 12, 2003, at 1E.

391

Dale K. DuPont, Future First Execs Jailed, MIAMI HERALD, May 3, 2003, at 3C.
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top executive with Financial Federated Title & Trust, was sentenced to fifty-five
years in prison.392 Brandau’s sentence is one of the longest ever handed down for
fraud.393 Brandau told investors he would use their funds to purchase viaticals, but
instead he spent nearly $117 million of this money on mansions, cars, boats and
helicopters.394 Based purely on public policy, it is in the best interest of the viator,
the investor, and the honest viatical settlement provider for the SEC to regulate
viatical settlements.
VII. ANALYSIS
There are three main reasons why the Eleventh Circuit was correct in
holding that the Securities Acts grant the SEC the power necessary to regulate
viatical settlements. First, the Eleventh Circuit correctly followed precedent in
anchoring its finding of an investment contract on both pre- and post-purchase
entrepreneurial and managerial activities. Second, the Mutual Benefits holding
embraced the underlying principles of the Securities Acts, namely facilitating full
disclosure and preventing fraud. Finally, by rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s stringent
bright-line rule, the Eleventh Circuit adhered to the doctrine that remedial legislation
must be applied flexibly. Both courts and legal scholars repeatedly emphasize these
three fundamentals when analyzing Howey and the securities laws.395

392

Johnny Diaz, Davie Man Sentenced to 55 Years for Fraud, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 12, 2000, at 5B.

393

Id.

394

Id.

The Life Partners decision has been critiqued by legal scholars on several grounds. First, the court
erred by creating a loophole that other promoters could use in order to avoid securities regulations.
Albert, supra note 3, at 423–24; Miranda, supra note 125, at 303–06. Second, the court erred by failing
to apply the Howey test broadly and flexibly. Luxenberg, supra note 113 at 375-79; Miranda, supra note
125, at 306. Third, the D.C. Circuit ignored economic reality and instead created a formulistic brightline rule. M. Davis, supra note 138, at 963–67; Elizabeth L. Deeley, Note, Viatical Settlements Are Not
Securities: Is It Law or Sympathy?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 382, 406–07 (1998); Katherine DePeri,
Recent Decision, Brokered Viatical Settlement Contracts are not Securities—Securities Exchange
Commission v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996), 70 TEMP. L. REV. 857, 871 (1997);
Miranda, supra note 125, at 300, 309–310. Fourth, the court ignored the remedial purposes of the
Securities Acts, namely to protect investors and prevent fraud. Deeley, supra, at 407; DePeri, supra, at
869, 874–75. Finally, some commentators have highlighted a list of cases in which courts relied on
pre-purchase efforts to satisfy the “efforts of others” prong. Luxenberg, supra note 113, at 376–79;
Miranda, supra note 125, at 288–90.
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A. Eleventh Circuit Supported by Precedent
While most courts look first to post-purchase efforts, courts have never
deemed the timing of the promoter’s activities dispositive.396 In fact, there are
several decisions in which the court based its holding primarily on pre-purchase
efforts.397
In Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino,398 the court found that the fourth
prong of the Howey test was satisfied because “[a]n investor was dependent upon [the
promoters] for the utilization of their ‘expertise in selecting the type and quality of
Scotch whisky and casks to be purchased…[and] the very investment made was in
goods to be specifically selected by” the promoters.399 The selection process on which the
court based its decision occurred prior to closing.400
In SEC v. International Loan Network, Inc.,401 the D.C. Circuit also found prepurchase efforts significant.402 International Loan’s business involved a pyramid
scheme in which people joined the network and paid a membership fee.403 Current
investors (i.e., members) would bring potential investors to promotional meetings.404
If the promoters were “‘successful in persuading the potential recruit to join, the
person who extended the invitation [to the potential recruit], otherwise known as the
‘sponsor,’ w[ould] be credited as having made the recruitment and w[ould] earn
Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d 536, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, J., dissenting) (stating that there is “no
case which holds, as the majority here does, that pre-purchase activities alone cannot satisfy Howey’s
[fourth] prong”).
396

See SEC v. Int’l Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Bailey v. J.W.K. Props., Inc.,
904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990); Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir.
1974); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distribs., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

397
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493 F.2d 1027.

399

Id. at 1035.

400

Miranda, supra note 125, at 288-89.

401

968 F.2d 1304.

402

Int’l Loan, 968 F.2d at 1308 & n.9.

403

Id. at 1306.

404

Id. at 1306-08 & n.9.
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income from it.”405 The court ultimately held that the promoters’ pre-closing efforts
to “bait” new members were directly linked to investor profits.406 Therefore, the
“efforts of others” prong was satisfied.407
In Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc.,408 investors purchased interests in the
defendants’ cattle breeding program.409 Prior to receiving investor funds, the
promoters selected embryos and prepared them for crossbreeding.410 The investors
knew nothing about this process and depended on the promoters’ expertise.411
Eventually the defendants abandoned the scheme, and investors sued, alleging
violations of federal securities laws.412 The court held that the realization of profits
was dependent upon the pre-purchase embryo selection process.413 Accordingly, it
held that the scheme constituted a security.414
In SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distributors,415 yet another court focused primarily
on the promoters’ pre-purchase activities in holding that the Howey test was
satisfied.416 The promoters in Brigadoon selected rare coins and prepared coin
portfolios for sale.417 The people who bought the portfolios did so not as coin
405

Id. at 1308 n.9.

406

Id. at 1308.

407

Id.

408

904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990).

409

Id. at 919.

410

Id. at 923.

411

Id. at 924.

412

Id. at 919.

413

Id. at 923–25.

414

Id. at 925.

415

388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

416

Id. at 1293.

417

Id. at 1290, 1293.
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collectors but as investors.418 The defendants argued that they did not require
customers to use their coin selecting experts.419 Testimony revealed, however, that a
majority of the portfolios were comprised of coins specifically chosen by the
defendants’ coin specialists.420 Because of the promoters’ pre-purchase coin
selection, the court found the “efforts of others” prong satisfied.421
All of these cases link investor profits to the promoters’ specialized skills.
The facts in these cases are similar to the facts in both Mutual Benefits and Life
Partners.422 Viatical companies use many experts to generate investor profits.423
Viatical settlement providers must analyze the viator’s medical condition to obtain, at
a minimum, information regarding T-cell count, platelet count, and pulmonary
studies.424 These companies must also be knowledgeable about insurance policies
and know how to negotiate for a policy, whether the policy is assignable, and
whether it is a group or individual policy.425 They must also have knowledge of the
specific state insurance laws and track all relevant legislation affecting viaticals.426
Finally, viatical settlement providers need legal experts to draft contracts, ensure that
other beneficiaries will not attempt to claim death benefits, be cognizant of tax
regulations, and draft other necessary legal documents.427

418

Id. at 1291.

419

Id. at 1293.

420

Id.

421

Id.

422

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005); Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

423

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 738–39.

424

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 555 (Wald, J., dissenting).

425

Id.

426

Id. at 555–56.

427

Id. at 555.
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Cases in which pre-purchase efforts alone satisfy the fourth prong are rare.428
However, in such cases, “the most common pre-purchase managerial activity is the
use of some special expertise to select items for purchase [so as] to identify items
‘within a particular class of items which will appreciate at a faster rate than will the
particular class in general.’”429 The infrequency of this type of case should not render
pre-purchase efforts irrelevant.430 At the time of the D.C. Circuit’s decision, no court
had previously focused on the timing of entrepreneurial and managerial efforts.431
In analyzing viatical settlement agreements, courts should focus on the
nature of the promoter’s efforts rather than on the timing of those efforts.432 This
focus will force courts to evaluate the underlying economic reality of the investment
rather than the form of the investment.433 If investors rely on the promoter’s special
expertise to generate profits, it is more likely that the “efforts of others” requirement
will be met.434
B. Eleventh Circuit Embraced Purpose of Securities Acts
By passing the Securities Acts, the legislature intended to force promoters to
disclose pertinent information to investors.435 In Mutual Benefits I, Judge Moreno
accurately explained that securities laws require promoters to disclose information
that is not available to the public.436 If the public is investing in the stock market,
individuals already have access to relevant information rendering securities laws
428

See id. at 553.

429

Id. at 554 (quoting Bailey v. J.W.K. Props. Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 924 (4th Cir. 1990)).

430

See id. at 553–55 (Wald J., dissenting).

431

See id. at 553.

432 Id. at 551 (stating that in determining whether the “efforts of others” prong is satisfied, courts
should focus on “the kind and degree of dependence between the investors’ profits and the
promoter’s activities”).
433

See id. at 550.

434

See id. at 554.

435

H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933); S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 6 (1933).

436

Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
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redundant.437 In the viatical industry, potential investors need to be able to find out
how others have fared with a particular promoter.438 This type of information is not
available to the public at large.439 This is exactly the type of information the
securities laws hope to unearth.
Despite the foregoing, in Life Partners, the majority did not think that
investors need information when profitability of the investment depends on prepurchase efforts.440 “Presumably this is because investors already have a potent
weapon—they can refuse to invest.”441 In her dissent, Judge Wald debunked this
argument because investors also need to be protected prior to investing.442 The
dissent explained that the majority’s view “has been rejected by Congress, which
made the goal of ensuring that investors have adequate information before they
commit their money…the central concern of the Securities Acts.”443
The second purpose of the Securities Acts was to prevent further fraud in
the securities industry.444 Preventing fraud is important from a public policy
standpoint.445 The SEC, however, has the power to regulate all securities.446 It is
irrelevant that a particular scheme is promoted by using false information. If all of
the Howey elements are met, the seller of securities must adhere to the law.447
437

Id. at 1342.
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Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d 536, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, J. dissenting).

439

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933); S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 6 (1933).

445

See discussion supra Part VI.
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See 17 C.F.R. § 200.1 (2005).
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See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
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In Life Partners, the lack of any evidence of fraud seemed to sway the court.448
Prior to the case’s reaching the D.C. Circuit, the SEC performed a two-year
investigation into LPI’s business practices.449 Despite this exhaustive examination,
the SEC failed to find any “evidence or…allegations ‘that any investor, terminally ill
patient, or insurance company had been defrauded, misled, or [was] in any way
dissatisfied with an LPI viatical settlement.’”450 In this environment, the D.C. Circuit
could more comfortably conclude that viatical settlements were not investment
contracts. Additionally, Life Partners was decided prior to the medical advancements
that plagued MBC’s investors in particular and the viatical settlement industry at
large.451
Perhaps in light of MBC’s fraudulent business practices, the Eleventh Circuit
could more easily conclude that viatical settlements should be monitored.
Nevertheless, the existence of fraud is not a prerequisite for holding that a particular
scheme is a security. Although there was no evidence of fraud, the D.C. Circuit
erred by dismissing the SEC’s argument that “the securities laws, and in particular
the disclosure requirements,…are intended to prevent abuses before they arise.”452
Perhaps if the Life Partners court had found evidence of fraud it “would have
determined that more disclosure was required, and, thus, ruled the interests were
securities.”453 Unfortunately, if the D.C. Circuit had reached the opposite
conclusion, the Mutual Benefits fiasco might have been avoided.
C. Eleventh Circuit Flexibly Applied Howey
Because the Securities Acts are remedial in nature, courts must apply them
flexibly.454 Congress included the term “investment contract” in its definition of a
448

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d 536, 538-39 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

449

Id.

450

Id.

Mutual Benefits II, No. 04-60573-CIV-MORENO/GARBER, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23008, at
*34–36 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2004) (explaining the effects of medical advancements on the viatical
industry).

451
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Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 539.

453

DePeri, supra note 395 at 873–74.

Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (emphasizing that “remedial legislation should be
construed broadly to effectuate its purposes”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933); S. REP. NO.
454
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“security” because it was “‘sufficiently broad to reach ‘devious’ schemes.’”455 It was
Congress’ intention that courts broadly apply this term.456
In Mutual Benefits, both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit explained
the importance of flexibility.457 According to the district court, Congress chose the
term “investment contract” because state courts had not narrowly defined the
term.458 In rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s bright-line test, the district court explained
that “[b]right-line rules are discouraged in the context of federal securities laws for
the reason that they tend to create loopholes that can be used by the clever and
dishonest.”459 The Eleventh Circuit also stressed the Supreme Court’s statement in
Howey that its test “‘embodies a flexible rather than a static principle.’”460 The court
also pointed out that only a year earlier, in Edwards, the Supreme Court reiterated the
need for flexibility when applying securities laws.461 In fact, the Edwards Court
expressly stated that it refused to read a limitation into the securities laws that would
undermine their purposes.462 By creating a bright-line test in Life Partners, the D.C.
Circuit read a limitation into the Securities Acts that is demonstrably at odds with
legislative intent.

73-47, at 7 (1933) (President Roosevelt’s message directing Congress to enact “legislation to correct” the
problems caused by the stock market crash) (emphasis added).
455

Miranda, supra note 125, at 279.

456

Id.

457 Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d 737, 742 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “the Supreme Court provided
a flexible test for determining whether a particular transaction qualified as an ‘investment contract’”)
(citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–9 (1946)); Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337,
1339 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (stating that “[a]fter a survey of the relevant case law, the Court has identified
the principle of flexibility in the law’s application”).
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Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
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Id. at 1343.
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Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 742 (citing Howey, 328 U.S. at 299).
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Id. (citing SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004)).
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Life Partners conspicuously lacks a discussion of flexibility.463 Similar to most
other cases that have interpreted securities laws, Mutual Benefits highlighted precedent
in which the courts stressed flexibility.464 A discussion of precedent emphasizing the
adaptable nature of the Howey test is missing in Life Partners.465 In fact, the word
“flexible,” “flexibly,” or “flexibility” is not found anywhere in the majority’s
opinion.466 This separates the D.C. Circuit from most courts which have ruled on
this issue.467
At best, the D.C. Circuit was inconsistent regarding flexibility. On one hand,
the court accepted the flexible rule adopted in Turner regarding the word “solely.”468
The court then proceeded to create an even more inflexible rule by holding that prepurchase managerial and entrepreneurial efforts alone could not satisfy the “efforts
of others” prong.469 With this decision, the court rejected the legislative intent that
the securities laws be flexibly applied.470 The D.C. Circuit’s bright-line rule creates a
loophole that allows promoters to easily evade the SEC.471 Even if a promoter’s prepurchase activities are unmistakably profit-generating, the promoter can simply
eliminate all post-purchase efforts and successfully avoid securities regulation.472

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d 536, 536–49 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Conversely, the dissent’s second paragraph
reads in part, “Several background principles should guide our analysis of whether or not…Howey's
[fourth] prong [is satisfied,]…[and o]ne such principle is that we should avoid imposing overly formal
restrictions on what qualifies as a security and instead apply securities laws flexibly so as to achieve
their remedial purposes.” Id. at 549 (Wald, J., dissenting).
463

464

Mutual Benefits III, 408 F.3d at 743–44.
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Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 536–49.
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See cases cited supra note 239.

Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 545 (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482
(9th Cir. 1973)).
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Id. at 548; see also Siporin v. Carrington, 23 P.3d 92, at 98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
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Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
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This is analogous to the loophole the Turner court sought to eliminate: one that
permitted promoters to completely avoid the SEC by simply giving investors a small,
irrelevant task.473 Although the Turner court effectively closed one loophole, the
decision in Life Partners created a new, and perhaps more dangerous, one.474
In Life Partners, the defendants took advantage of the loophole by
manipulating their corporate structure to avoid the Securities Acts.475 In the first
district court decision, the court concluded that the “efforts of others” prong had
been satisfied in part because LPI, and not the investor, was named as the owner and
beneficiary of the policy post-purchase.476 Although the court’s order required the
defendants to comply with securities laws,477 LPI instead shifted ownership to the
investor and continued selling interests in viaticals.478
In the district court’s second decision, the court again ordered LPI to comply
with securities regulations; however, LPI again altered its scheme to avoid the court’s
directions.479 In a footnote, the court noted that it did “not…find that LPI’s preclosing activities alone [were] sufficient to sustain [its] finding. Instead, the court
relie[d] on the pre-closing activities in addition to the post-closing activities that LPI

472 Id.
Judge Wald also criticized the loophole created by the majority’s opinion, stating that
“[i]nsisting that some activity must occur after purchase but allowing any activity, no matter how
trivial, to satisfy this requirement violates the principle that form should not be elevated over
substance and economic reality.” Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d at 551 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).
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Id.; see Mutual Benefits I, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
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Life Partners III, No. 94-1861 (RCL), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3451, at * 2-3 (D.D.C. 1996).
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Life Partners I, 898 F. Supp. 14, 22 (D.D.C. 1995).
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Id. at 24.
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Life Partners II, 912 F. Supp. 4, 6-7 (D.D.C 1996).

479 Id.

at 12–13; Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d 536, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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continue[d] to perform.”480 LPI latched on to this statement, did away with all of its
post-purchase activities, and continued selling interests in viatical settlements.481
In response, the SEC brought LPI before the district court a third time.482
The SEC explained it “w[ould] not provide advice to LPI on how to structure their
transactions so as to fall outside the purview of the securities laws [because] they are
not in the business of helping companies subvert the protections provided to
investors by the securities laws.”483 Relying on precedent, the court reasoned that
LPI’s changes were only in form and not based on the economic reality of the
situation.484 Neither the district court nor the SEC was satisfied with LPI’s efforts to
manipulate its operations in an attempt to avoid securities regulations.485
The D.C. Circuit’s holding that the third version of LPI’s scheme fell outside
the purview of the Securities Acts allowed it to ignore LPI’s manipulations.486 In so
holding, the Life Partners court again ignored the underlying purposes of the
Securities Acts.487 The Howey test is flexible for the specific reason of preventing
promoters from structuring their programs outside the SEC’s grasp.488
The Life Partners decision served as a blueprint for viatical companies that
sought to avoid securities regulations.489 In fact, Mutual Benefits Corporation was
480

Life Partners II, 912 F. Supp. at 9 n.7.

481

Life Partners III, No. 94-1861 (RCL), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3451, at *2 (D.D.C. 1996).
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Id. at *1.
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Life Partners II, 912 F. Supp. at 7 n.2.

Life Partners III, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3451, at *2-4 (holding that “it is neither realistic nor feasible
for multiple investors, who are strangers to each other, to perform post-purchase tasks without relying
on the knowledge and expertise of a third party”).
484
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Id. at *3–4.
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Life Partners IV, 87 F.3d 536, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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aware of the Life Partners decision and made a conscious effort to replicate LPI’s
business practices.490 In Mutual Benefits, the district court stated that Life Partners had
created a loophole “which became the [defendants’] corporate structure model.”491
In fact, a “trustee for MBC[ ] testified…that the ‘attorneys of Mutual Benefits were
cognizant of the SEC v. Life Partners case,’” and MBC’s counsel testified that MBC
“attempted to restructure certain portions of its operations to conform to the D.C.
Circuit’s ruling.”492 This example highlights the problem with the Life Partners
decision. Because Life Partners left open this loophole, MBC was able to avoid SEC
regulation for more than a decade.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The consensus is that viatical settlement agreements are securities and should
be monitored by the SEC. There are several reasons why this outcome is correct.
First, precedent exists in which courts refused to distinguish between pre- and postpurchase efforts when holding that a given scheme must be monitored by the SEC.
Second, Mutual Benefits adheres to the underlying objectives of the Securities Acts of
1933 and 1934. Third, Mutual Benefits flexibly applies the Howey test. Fourth, nearly
every state legislature agrees that viatical settlements are securities and has added
some form of the term to the definition of “security” in its state statute. Fifth,
public policy dictates that investors need protection from viatical settlement
providers. The securities laws give investors this protection. Finally, in light of the
unanimous decision in Edwards, the Supreme Court would most likely hold that
viatical settlement agreements should be treated as investment contracts.493
In light of the tepid response to Life Partners, the decision seems to be an
aberration. Contrary to what many in the legal community predicted, the D.C.
Circuit’s holding and rationale did not metastasize.494 In fact, the opposite occurred.
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493 M. Davis, supra note 138, at 967 (stating that “[i]f the Life Partners decision leads to a clash between
the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court, it appears likely the D.C. Circuit’s alteration of the [“efforts
of others”] prong…will be erased and a new test formulated”).
494 See, e.g., Jennifer A. Lann, Note, Viatical Settlements: An Explanation of the Process, an Analysis of State
Regulations, and an Examination of Viatical Settlements as Securities, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 923, 943 (1998). In
conclusion, the author explained that “[t]he view that viatical settlements are securities under the
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After surveying virtually every available case that has addressed this exact issue,
nearly all of them, for some or all of the reasons listed above, refused to follow both
the reasoning and holding in Life Partners. Now that the Mutual Benefits decision
exists, courts no longer have to justify their refusals to follow Life Partners. Instead,
as the district court in Wuliger v. Mann has done, courts can cite the Mutual Benefits
decision as precedent for a holding that viatical settlement agreements must be
regulated by the SEC.495

Security Act of 1933 is the minority view [and] SEC v. Life Partners, Inc. may be an indication of the
direction of future litigation.” Id.
495 Wuliger v. Mann, No. 3:03 CV 1531, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13021, at *13 (N.D. Ohio July 1,
2005) (citing Mutual Benefits III, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2004)).

